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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) pursuant to its rule-making authority granted under Section
1
10(b), protect investors in business enterprises from securities fraud.
These broad anti-fraud provisions allow the SEC to pursue
enforcement actions against those who, in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security, use “any manipulative or deceptive
2
device,” which includes making “any untrue statement of material
fact” or omitting a material fact “necessary in order to make the
3
statements made . . . not misleading.” Additionally, although Rule
10b-5 is silent as to whether it allows for a private right of action, the
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the rule to allow shareholders of
corporations adversely affected by securities fraud to bring private
4
claims against violators of the rule.
The SEC enforcement mechanism, coupled with the private
right of action available to shareholders, provides necessary
protection for investors in an exceedingly complex corporate climate
5
that is increasingly rife with securities fraud. Indeed, under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC and private litigants can pursue claims
not only against issuers and corporate insiders, but also against
culpable secondary actors such as underwriters, accountants,
investment banks, and lawyers, thereby broadening the net of

1

Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the Charm? Janus and the Proper Balance
Between Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV.
1019, 1026–27 (2012).
2
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
3
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011).
4
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
(1971).
5
Speaking to corporate fraud generally, the economists Luigi Zingales and
Adair Morse of the University of Chicago and Alexander Dyck of the University of
Toronto, in a study pulling from frauds uncovered during the dot-com bubble,
estimated that in any given year, fraud was being committed by eleven to thirteen
percent of the “large companies” in the country. Eduardo Porter, The Spreading
Scourge of Corporate Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/business/economy/the-spreading-scourge-of
-corporate-corruption.html. The last decade has witnessed a boom of corporate
malfeasance, as evidenced by the scandals involving Enron and WorldCom and,
more recently, those related to the financial crisis, such as the scandals involving
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Cosenza, supra note
1, at 1022. And there is evidence to suggest that the latest uptick is not merely a
reflection of the business cycle, but rather an indication that corporate corruption
has become more prevalent over the years. Porter, supra.
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potential liability and increasing the protection afforded to investors.
But the ability of the SEC and, especially, private litigants to pursue
claims against both primary and secondary actors has been
7
significantly curtailed in recent years. The most recent and glaring
example of this was in 2011 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
8
in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.
To be liable for a misrepresentation under 10b-5(b), the
9
defendant must have been the “maker” of the false statement. The
Janus decision significantly limits the universe of individuals who can
be considered a “maker” of a misstatement for purposes of 10b-5
liability. Specifically, the Supreme Court held in Janus that, to
establish a defendant as the “maker” of the alleged misstatements, a
plaintiff must show that the defendant was the person or entity with
“ultimate authority” over the misstatements, including their “content
10
and whether and how to communicate” them to the public.
Therefore, merely participating in the preparation or publication of a
statement, even if that involvement is significant, is not sufficient to
11
subject one to 10b-5 liability as a “maker.”
In Janus, the defendant that escaped liability was the investment
12
advisor to a mutual fund—a secondary actor. But application of
Janus has not been limited to its facts. For instance, some
commentators have already noted the difficulty Janus creates in
imposing liability on secondary actors other than investment
advisors—actors such as underwriters, auditors, investment bankers,
13
and lawyers. Such persons may have significant influence over a
corporate statement, but they rarely have “ultimate authority” over it.
And lower courts that have interpreted Janus have routinely found
that it applies not only to secondary actors, but also to corporate
14
insiders such as directors, officers, and employees. For lower courts
6

Private plaintiffs can pursue actions against any “secondary actors . . . ‘who
have some relationship with the primary wrongdoer.’” Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1022
(quoting Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 80 n.4 (1981)). The SEC is typically more limited in whom
it can pursue in an enforcement action. Id. at 1022 n.1.
7
See infra Part II for a more complete discussion of the historical development
of the 10b-5 cause of action.
8
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
9
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011). This section makes it unlawful “[t]o make
any untrue statement of . . . material fact.” Id.
10
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 2299.
13
See, e.g., Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1070–83.
14
See, e.g., Red River Res., Inc. v. Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM,
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analyzing whether a claimant can proceed against a particular
insider, whether the misstatement was publicly attributed to the
corporate insider appears determinative—courts have allowed claims
to proceed where there was attribution and dismissed those where
there was not.
Even though lower courts are finding that Janus does not bar
claims against insiders where there is public attribution, many such
claims still will ultimately be unsuccessful because a plaintiff may be
15
unable to establish that the defendant acted with scienter, a
16
necessary element to imposition of 10b-5 liability. In such cases,
difficulty arises when the individual to whom a statement is publicly
attributed—i.e., the person considered to have “ultimate authority”
under Janus—had no knowledge of its falsity. If this individual is seen
as the only potential “maker” of the misstatement, and scienter exists
only in some other culpable insider, then there will be no corporate
insider against whom a 10b-5 claim could be pursued.
After Janus, identifying an individual insider to hold liable is not
the only problem. In many jurisdictions, this issue of scienter may
make it difficult to bring claims against even the issuer to which the
17
misrepresentation is attributed. A plaintiff typically can establish the
scienter of a corporation by imputing to the corporation the scienter
of one or more culpable officers, directors, or employees. But some
jurisdictions require, for imputation purposes, that the individual
18
with the requisite scienter also be the “maker” of the statement.
Such jurisdictions have rejected the theory commonly referred to as

2012 WL 2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012) (“The holding in Janus is not
explicitly limited to its facts. . . . [C]ourts have applied Janus to corporate insiders.”).
See infra Part III.A for a more complete discussion of the application of Janus to
corporate insiders.
15
Scienter is defined as the defendant’s “intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud . . . .” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976).
16
See infra Part II.B for a more complete discussion of the elements necessary to
bring a claim under Rule 10b-5.
17
See infra Part III.B.2 for a more complete discussion of the limitations Janus
may impose on pursuing claims, even against corporate issuers to which
misstatements are attributed.
18
See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that the plaintiff must plead scienter “with respect to those
individuals who actually made the false statements” for such scienter to be imputed
to the corporate entity); Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d
353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion of “collective scienter” and instead
requiring the plaintiff to establish the state of mind of the individual corporate
official who made or issued the statement or ordered its making or furnished
information for inclusion therein for an individual’s scienter to be imputed to the
corporation).
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“collective scienter,” which allows a court to impute to the
corporation the scienter of some or all of its employees, even where
none of the wrongdoers are necessarily the “maker” or where the
19
wrongdoer has not yet been identified. As such, in jurisdictions
rejecting collective scienter, courts may refuse to impute the scienter
of the individual to the corporation where the individual with
scienter is not the person who made the misrepresentation. In the
wake of Janus, which curtails the universe of potential “makers” of a
statement, plaintiffs in such jurisdictions may have no defendant with
the requisite scienter—not even the issuer itself. Consequently,
plaintiffs may have no defendant against whom they can pursue a
10b-5 claim, even in the face of blatant fraud.
Take, for example, the following hypothetical. Mr. Smith is the
Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Corporation X. Mr. Smith made
misstatements internally to employees of Corporation X that he knew
to be false at the time they were made. These misstatements were
made in a number of different forms. For instance, some were made
on a conference call to various employees and officers. Others were
made during presentations to the management team and other
employees. Some were made in written commentaries posted on
Corporation X’s internal website. The written commentaries bore a
written warning: “For internal use only.” Corporation X’s board of
directors and other members of the management team ultimately
incorporated some of Mr. Smith’s internal misstatements into public
disclosures that were communicated to Corporation X’s investors.
The board and management team (other than Mr. Smith) had no
reason to suspect that the COO’s statements were false. Yet there is
no dispute that the COO’s statements contained misrepresentations,
and there is no dispute that the COO knew his statements contained
misrepresentations at the time he made them.
When Corporation X eventually discovered and revealed the
misrepresentations, Corporation X’s stock price was negatively
affected. Shareholders of Corporation X who purchased stock after
the misrepresentations were communicated to the investing public
and before the statements were revealed as false, brought a 10b-5 suit
against the COO and Corporation X. At first blush, in the face of
obvious fraud in the form of admitted false statements by a high19

See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc.,
531 F.3d 190, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (applying collective scienter
to hold that it is possible to establish scienter at the pleading stage without being able
to name the individuals who devised and disseminated the fraud). See infra Part
III.B.2, for a more complete discussion of the theory of collective scienter.
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ranking officer, it would seem likely that the plaintiffs would prevail,
particularly when one considers that certainly the COO in such a case
would know that his internal communications would likely form the
basis for public disclosures. In the wake of Janus, however, the private
litigants may struggle to find a proper defendant.
The COO, for instance, can argue, based on Janus, that he did
not actually “make” the misrepresentations since he did not have the
“ultimate authority” over the statements, including their “content and
20
whether and how to communicate” them to the public. Rather, he
merely made internal communications and had no say in whether or
when or how such internal communications might ultimately be
relayed to the public. The COO could argue it was the board and
other members of the management team, or the corporation itself,
that must be seen as the maker of the misstatements. After Janus, this
argument would likely be successful and the COO would escape
liability.
Moreover, while the shareholder-plaintiffs might have a good
case that Corporation X, along with individual board members or
other members of the management team responsible for the public
disclosure, were the makers of the misstatements for purposes of
Janus, it is possible that the plaintiffs would not be able to establish
scienter as to these potential defendants. Mr. Smith is likely the only
person in this scenario with the requisite scienter for 10b-5 liability.
As such, the individual board members or other members of the
management team responsible for the public disclosure cannot be
proper defendants in a 10b-5 action. The scienter of Mr. Smith could
in theory be imputed to Corporation X for purposes of establishing
10b-5 liability in a jurisdiction allowing collective scienter. But in a
jurisdiction that allows the scienter of only the “maker” to be imputed
to the corporation, Mr. Smith’s scienter could not be imputed to
Corporation X because, under Janus, Mr. Smith did not have
“ultimate authority” over the misstatements. Corporation X would
escape liability.
After Janus, in this realistic scenario concerning undisputed
21
wrongdoing, a private litigant may be without recourse under the
federal securities laws. Moreover, because, as discussed infra, courts
20

Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2298
(2011).
21
These hypothetical facts do not present a particularly unique or unusual set of
circumstances. In fact, they are adapted from a securities fraud case pending at the
time of this writing in the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division.
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–11, SEC v. Dafoitis, No. 11-cv-00137WHA (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012), 2012 WL 2848995.
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are applying Janus to actions instigated by the SEC as well as to
actions brought by private litigants, even the SEC’s ability to pursue
such claims in enforcement actions may be hampered.
This Article explores the repercussions of the Janus decision.
Rather than focusing on the limitations that Janus imposes on the
liability of secondary actors such as, in the case of Janus, an
investment advisor to a mutual fund, this Article looks instead at the
implications of Janus on the liability of primary actors—the issuer
itself and its corporate insiders. Part II of this Article, by way of
background, discusses how a private suit or an SEC enforcement
action proceeds under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Part II includes
a brief discussion of the history of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence and the varying avenues of liability that have been
available to plaintiffs under these rules. Part II culminates with a
description of the Janus case.
Part III of this Article addresses the gaps in liability created by
Janus. Specifically, it addresses how lower courts are interpreting
Janus with respect to the liability of corporate insiders. It also
analyzes the potential liability gap for the issuers themselves, which is
compounded in jurisdictions that have rejected notions of collective
scienter and only allow scienter to be imputed to the corporation
from a corporate insider if that insider in fact made the
misrepresentation at issue. Additionally, Part III looks at the issue of
how lower courts are applying Janus to claims under other federal
securities laws and how such an extension would further widen the
above-mentioned liability gaps. Part IV discusses some policy
considerations that weigh in favor of warranting a more expansive
view of liability for fraudulent misrepresentations than that permitted
by Janus. Finally, Part V proposes some potential solutions to the
liability gaps established by Janus and its intersection with cases
rejecting collective scienter.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 10(B) JURISPRUDENCE
A. Overview of Federal Securities Laws
In response to the 1929 stock market crash and ensuing Great
Depression, Congress enacted the first major pieces of federal
legislation to regulate the offer and sale of securities. Two of the
most important pieces of legislation enacted during this time were
the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities
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22

Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). Often referred to as
the “truth in securities law,” the Securities Act was aimed at
disclosure—ensuring that investors receive complete and accurate
information about a potential investment before purchasing
23
securities. To oversimplify, the Securities Act can be thought of as
regulating the disclosures provided to investors in the initial
distribution of securities—i.e., through the primary market—while
the Exchange Act can be thought of as regulating trading between
third parties on the secondary market, after the initial distribution by
24
the issuer.
The Exchange Act was the vehicle through which
Congress created the SEC, which was given broad authority to
25
regulate the securities industry.
B. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Establishing a Cause of Action
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is a crucial mechanism for
preventing and punishing fraud in the purchase and sale of
26
securities. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for anyone, directly or
indirectly:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
27
or for the protection of investors.
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Section 10(b), the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful for anyone, directly
or indirectly:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
28
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . .
22

STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 10 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2009).
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM.,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
24
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 10.
25
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 23.
26
Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1026 (noting that 10(b) is an essential tool for
promoting information integrity).
27
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
28
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
23

JEFFRIES (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/9/2013 8:14 AM

ISSUER LIABILITY POST-JANUS

499

As part of its broad regulatory authority, the SEC can bring
enforcement actions against violators of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5. The rule is silent regarding whether a private right of action exists
for violations of the anti-fraud provisions, but the U.S. Supreme
Court settled the issue over forty years ago, determining that private
29
litigants could pursue claims under Rule 10b-5. To establish a 10b-5
claim, a private litigant must prove (a) a material misrepresentation
or omission made by the defendant, (b) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security,
(c) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (d) economic
loss, (e) loss causation (a causal connection between the material
30
misrepresentation and the loss), and (f) scienter. When the SEC
brings a 10b-5 claim, it is required only to show that the defendant
(a) made a material misrepresentation or materially misleading
omission, (b) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
31
(c) with scienter. While the SEC’s elements to satisfy a 10b-5 claim
are somewhat less stringent than those of a private litigant in that the
32
SEC need not prove reliance, causation, or injury, to be successful, it
still must establish the scienter of the defendant and that the
33
defendant “made” the material misstatement. These two elements
are the focus of this Article.
C. Aiding and Abetting Liability: Before and After Central Bank
Historically, plaintiffs invoking the anti-fraud provisions of Rule
10b-5 for misstatements proceeded under Rule 10b-5(b), regardless
of whether they were pursuing a primary actor, like the issuer itself,
34
or a secondary actor, like an issuer’s accounting firm. One question
29

Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
(1971). The existence of a private cause of action is well-settled and has recently
been affirmed in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct.
2296, 2301–02 (2011).
30
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)
(citation omitted).
31
SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 766 (11th Cir. 2007).
32
SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11-cv-116-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 695668, at
*4 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
33
It should be noted that the SEC is not required to comply with the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, which is discussed in more detail infra in Part
III.B.1. Therefore, though the SEC and private litigants both have to establish
scienter, the SEC’s burden may be less onerous than the private litigant’s since the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act imposes heightened pleading requirements
with respect to scienter. Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313
(2007). See also infra n.181.
34
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011). This subsection, set out in its entirety supra
in Part II.B makes it unlawful “to make” a material false statement.

JEFFRIES (DO NOT DELETE)

500

4/9/2013 8:14 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:491

that arose fairly early in 10b-5 litigation was whether a plaintiff could
succeed against a defendant who was not necessarily the primary
violator, but rather was an individual or entity that engaged in some
preparatory or other activity that helped the primary violator
perpetrate the fraud. Prior to 1994, all of the circuits were in
agreement that the answer to this question was yes: Rule 10b-5
allowed the SEC and private plaintiffs to assert claims of “aiding and
abetting” violations of the federal securities laws against, for instance,
corporate directors and officers or secondary actors like lawyers or
35
accountants.
These defendants were individuals who were not
responsible for the primary violation itself, but who somehow
36
“‘participated’ in the process of issuing a misleading statement.”
Courts even allowed inaction by a corporate insider to result in aiding
and abetting liability, so long as the inaction was supporting a
37
primary violation.
Although there were variations among
jurisdictions as to the elements of a claim of aiding and abetting,
generally courts required that a plaintiff establish (a) the existence of
an underlying primary violation of Section 10(b), (b) the defendant’s
knowledge of the primary violation, and (c) substantial assistance of
38
the violation by the defendant.
In 1994, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
39
Denver, N.A., the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to the ability of
private litigants to use aiding and abetting theories of liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court held that private civil
liability under Section 10(b) does not extend to those who merely aid
and abet the violation rather than actually engaging in the
40
manipulative or deceptive practice at issue. In foreclosing plaintiffs
from using theories of aiding and abetting in securities litigation, the
Court went against years of unanimous precedent among the lower
41
courts allowing for such claims. Though the facts and holding of
Central Bank dealt only with a private right of action under Section

35

Thomas O. Gorman, Who Does the Catch-all Antifraud Provision Catch? Central
Bank, Stoneridge, and Scheme Liability in the Supreme Court, 1620 PLI / CORP 189, 198
(Sept.–Oct. 2007) (PLI Order No. 11072).
36
Darryl P. Rains, The Future of Control Person Liability after Janus, 9 SEC. LITIG.
REP. 10 (2012); see also Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1033.
37
See Rains, supra note 36, at 10.
38
Gorman, supra note 35, at 199.
39
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
40
Id. at 191.
41
Id. at 197 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In so holding, the Court focused on the
text of the statute itself, noting that it does not reach those who aid and abet a
Section 10(b) violation. Id. at 177.
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10(b), it became clear that the eradication of aiding and abetting
liability applied not only to private claims, but also to SEC
42
enforcement actions. In reaction to Central Bank, the Senate held
43
hearings within one month of the decision, and a year later,
Congress added Section 20(e) to the Exchange Act, which expressly
authorizes the SEC to bring 10b enforcement actions for aiding and
44
abetting. Congress, however, did nothing to extend such claims to
the private right of action. Therefore, while the SEC can bring aiding
and abetting claims under the new statutory authority, private
45
litigants were and are still barred from using this theory of recovery.
In the aftermath of Central Bank, courts struggled with how to
address questions of secondary actor liability in private 10b-5 suits
without running afoul of the Central Bank holding. Though the
Court in Central Bank had eliminated the possibility of private actions
for aiding and abetting violations of the federal securities laws, the
Court had expressly not foreclosed liability against secondary actors
altogether, holding that its decision “does not mean that secondary
actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under
46
the securities Acts.” According to the Court, any secondary actor
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement
or omission on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies “may be
liable as a primary violator . . . assuming all of the requirements for
47
primary liability . . . are met.” In attempting to walk the fine line
between allowing private plaintiffs to bring claims against secondary
actors for primary violations but still not allowing private plaintiffs to
bring claims for aiding and abetting, courts devised various standards
of liability under which to review 10b-5 claims against secondary
actors.
Two of the most prominent of the standards of liability were the
“bright line standard” adopted by the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits, and the “substantial participation test”
48
adopted by the Ninth Circuit. To be liable under the “bright line
standard,” a secondary actor must have made the misstatement, not
42

Gorman, supra note 35, at 201.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLP v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 173 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
44
15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006); see also Gorman, supra note 35, at 201. The addition
of Section 20(e) was in connection with the enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, described in more detail infra in Part III.B.1.
45
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.
46
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
47
Id. (emphasis in original).
48
Gorman, supra note 35, at 202–03.
43
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just participated in its creation. Specifically, the defendant must have
either (a) been named in the document with the misrepresentation,
(b) have signed the document, or (c) have been identified to
investors at the time of the dissemination of the misstatement to the
49
public. To be deemed liable under the less stringent “substantial
participation test,” the defendant merely needs to have knowingly
and substantially participated in the preparation of materially false or
50
misleading statements. In other words, even where there was no
public attribution of the misstatement to the secondary actor, such
actor could still have been involved in the deception to a sufficient
51
degree to warrant imposing primary liability.
A third standard of liability, very similar to the substantial
participation test, was adopted by the Third Circuit and dubbed the
52
“creator standard.”
Under this test, as under the substantial
participation test, the defendant need not have been the person who
made the misrepresentation, nor must the misstatement have been
publicly attributed to the defendant to create liability. Rather, the
plaintiff only had to prove that the secondary actor (a) was aware of
the misrepresentation, (b) could be considered the author or coauthor of the statement by having participated in the creation of the
statement, (c) knew the misrepresentation would be relied upon by
53
investors, and (d) met the other requirements for 10b-5 liability.
The substantial participation and the creator standards gave way
to a theory of liability referred to by some courts in the post-Central
54
Bank era as “scheme liability.” Under a theory of scheme liability,
plaintiffs would proceed not under Rule 10b-5(b), requiring the
defendant to have made a material misrepresentation or material
omission, but instead under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), which allows for
the imposition of liability on one who employed any “device, scheme,
or artifice” to defraud and on one who has engaged in “any act,
practice, or course of business which . . . would operate as a fraud or
55
deceit.” By using 10b-5(a) and (c) instead of (b), plaintiffs hoped to
49

Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1037.
Id. at 1043–44.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1047.
53
Id.
54
Gorman, supra note 35, at 214–17.
55
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2011). Because theories of “aiding and
abetting” had been available to plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5(b) prior to Central Bank,
courts had previously had little experience applying Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) in the
context of misrepresentations where the defendant had assisted in the preparation of
the misstatement but not necessarily been its maker. ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELE H.
50
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do an “end-run” around the requirement that the defendant be the
actual maker of the misrepresentation in instances where the
defendant participated in the fraud, but could not be identified as
56
the maker. Courts permitting claims of scheme liability generally
found that the alleged misrepresentations or omissions that formed
the basis of a Rule 10b-5(b) claim were insufficient evidence of
57
scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c). A defendant typically
still could be found liable as part of a fraudulent scheme, however, so
long as the scheme also encompassed conduct beyond those
58
misrepresentations or omissions.
Just as some courts began to read scheme liability very broadly to
incorporate a wide range of secondary actors and counterparties
59
within reach as defendants, the Supreme Court stepped in to end
the expansion in its 2008 decision Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC
60
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
D. Limiting Scheme Liability: Stoneridge
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stoneridge to address
whether a plaintiff can pursue claims against a defendant who did not
make a misrepresentation but did participate in a scheme to violate
61
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
In Stoneridge, the plaintiffs sued Charter Communications, Inc.
(Charter), a cable operator, for engaging in various practices to
62
fraudulently improve its quarterly reports. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
(Scientific) and Motorola, Inc. (Motorola), each suppliers and later
customers of Charter, were also named as defendants for

HUDSON, DUE DILIGENCE § 8:25, DUEDILSEC § 8:25 (Sep. 2011).
56
See HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 55.
57
See, e.g., WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d
1039, 1057 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 10b-5(a) or (c) “claim cannot be premised
on the alleged misrepresentations or omissions that form the basis of a Rule 10b-5(b)
claim”) (citation omitted); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir.
2005) (same).
58
WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl, 655 F.3d at 1057–58; SEC v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 359 (D.N.J. 2009); S.E.C. v. Patel, No. 07-cv-39-SM, 2009
WL 3151143, at *6–7 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 2009); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F.
Supp. 2d 433, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
59
These expansive readings of scheme liability seemed in some cases
indistinguishable from claims asserting theories of aiding and abetting, which of
course were extinguished by the Supreme Court’s 1994 Central Bank decision. See
HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 55.
60
552 U.S. 148 (2008).
61
Id. at 156.
62
Id. at 153.
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participating in Charter’s scheme to defraud.
Scientific and
Motorola provided Charter with cable boxes that Charter then
64
supplied to its customers. Charter entered into agreements with
Scientific and Motorola pursuant to which Charter would overpay
them for each cable box it purchased for a particular period of time,
with an agreement that Scientific and Motorola would reimburse “the
65
overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter.”
The
transactions had no business purpose. Rather, the transactions
allowed Charter to record the advertising purchases as revenue, in
violation of generally accepted accounting principles, and allowed
Charter to convince its auditor to approve a false financial statement
showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers,
66
even though it did not.
As part of the scheme, the companies
deceived Charter’s auditor by drafting documents to make the
67
transactions look unrelated.
Charter then filed false financial statements with the SEC, which
68
were thereby reported to the public, reflecting revenue and
69
operating cash flow inflated by approximately $17 million.
Motorola and Scientific had no role in preparing or disseminating
Charter’s financial statements and, in their own financial statements,
reflected the transactions appropriately according to generally
70
accepted accounting principles. Because Motorola and Scientific
allegedly knew or recklessly disregarded Charter’s intention to use
the transactions to inflate its revenues, and knew investors would rely
on Charter’s false financial statements, plaintiffs sued Motorola and
Scientific under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) under a theory of scheme
71
liability.
In affirming the Eighth Circuit’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit
against Motorola and Scientific, the Supreme Court held that
Charter’s investors could not show they relied on any
misrepresentations or other acts by Motorola or Scientific, a
72
necessary element of a 10b claim. The Court held that the plaintiff
63

Id.
Id. at 154.
65
Id.
66
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 154.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 155.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 155, 159–60.
72
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s
deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.”).
64

JEFFRIES (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/9/2013 8:14 AM

505

ISSUER LIABILITY POST-JANUS

could not show reliance on the actions of Motorola or Scientific
except in an “indirect chain” that the Court found “too remote for
73
liability.” The Court noted that the defendants did not do anything
that made it “necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the
74
transactions as it did” in its financial statements. In the Court’s view,
if it allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their claim, it would revive the
implied cause of action against any aider and abettor “if he or she
75
committed a deceptive act in the process of providing assistance,”
contrary to Congress’s determination that such claims should only be
76
available to the SEC.
But the Court’s holding in Stoneridge did not entirely quell
expansive interpretations of 10b-5 to allow for imposition of liability
against secondary actors. Because the Court cabined its holding to
the issue of reliance, it did not speak to the larger issue of whether or
not a defendant must have actually “made” a public misstatement to
77
be held liable. In fact, the Court specifically stated that it is not
necessarily the case that “[a]ll secondary actors . . . are immune from
78
private suit.” Instead, the Court reiterated what it had stated in
Central Bank—”the implied right of action in § 10(b) continues to
79
cover secondary actors who commit primary violations.” So, after
Stoneridge, the question remained open of when a defendant who
assisted in the preparation of a fraudulent statement, but to whom
that statement was not actually attributed, could be liable.
E. The Meaning of “Make” in Rule 10b-5: Janus
80

In 2011, in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the
Supreme Court finally addressed this issue head-on and provided a
more definitive statement of when liability can be imposed on a
secondary actor that participated in a fraudulent misrepresentation.
73

Id. The “indirect chain” to which the Court referred was the plaintiff’s
contention that, had the defendants not assisted Charter, Charter’s auditor would
not have been blind to the fraud, and the financial statement would have more
accurately reflected Charter’s financial position. Id. at 160. The plaintiffs asserted
the causal link was sufficient since the financial statement Charter released was the
foreseeable result of the defendants’ actions. Id. But, the Court did not think
reliance was established, particularly given the fact that the defendants’ actions were
never disclosed to the public. Id. at 161.
74
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161.
75
Id. at 162–63.
76
Id. at 163.
77
HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 55.
78
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166.
79
Id.
80
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
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The plaintiffs in Janus were shareholders of Janus Capital Group, Inc.
(JCG), who filed a private 10b-5 action against JCG and its wholly
owned subsidiary, Janus Capital Management, LLC (JCM), for
making false statements in mutual fund prospectuses filed by Janus
81
Investment Fund (JIF).
JCM was the investment advisor and
82
administrator for JIF. JIF was created by JCG, but was a separate
83
legal entity owned entirely by mutual fund investors.
JCM was
involved in preparing prospectuses issued by JIF and made those
84
available to investors on its own website. The Fourth Circuit had
held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that JCM made the
misleading statements in the prospectuses, for the purpose of 10b-5
liability, by having participated in the writing and dissemination of
85
the documents.
86
In a ground-breaking—and much-criticized —5-4 opinion, the
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that JCM could
87
not be liable because it did not make the statements in question.
The Court articulated the rule that, for purposes of 10b claims, the
“maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to
88
communicate it.” The Court went on to say that one who merely
89
prepares a statement on behalf of someone else is not its maker.
The Court likened the facts of the case to the relationship
between a speechwriter and the speech giver, stating that, though a
speechwriter might draft a speech, the person giving the speech is the
one with ultimate control over the content and thus should take the
90
credit or blame.
The Court also mentioned the relevance of
81

Id. at 2299–300.
Id at 2299.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 2305 n.12.
85
Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1065.
86
See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, A Mutual Fund Ruling Remains a Head-Scratcher,
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/business
/mutfund/effects-of-janus-case-remain-a-mystery-for-mutual-funds.html?pagewanted
=all; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders: Only the
Supreme Court Can “Make” a Tree, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 29, 2011, 9:27 A.M.), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu
/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capital-group-v-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme
-court-can-“make”-a-tree/; Editorial, So No One’s Responsible, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/opinion/15wed2.html.
87
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299.
88
Id. at 2302.
89
Id.
90
Id.
82
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publicly attributing the contents of a disclosure to a particular
individual or entity. Specifically, the Court stated that “attribution
within a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is
strong evidence that the statement was made by—and only by—the
91
party to whom it is attributed.” In so holding, the Court rejected the
argument, proposed by the United States in its amicus brief, that one
can “make” a statement by “creating” it or taking part in the creation
92
of it, even if the creator is not actually publicly identified. The
United States argued that this interpretation was consistent with the
ordinary meaning of the word “make,” but the Court found that such
an interpretation would be inconsistent with the precedent of Central
93
Bank and Stoneridge.
The Court held that, based on the facts presented, JCM did not
make the misstatements, but rather only JIF could be seen as the
maker because only JIF bore “the statutory obligation to file the
94
prospectuses with the SEC.” Since there was no allegation that JCM
filed the prospectuses and there was nothing in the filings that
attributed the statements to JCM rather than JIF, there could be no
95
liability against JCM. The Court’s decision in Janus, like that in
Stoneridge, seemed largely motivated by its concern with the expansion
96
of the judicially created private cause of action for 10b-5 violations.
The Janus decision has been criticized for, among other things,
the Court’s refusal to recognize the close relationship between a
mutual fund (e.g., JIF) and its advisor (e.g., JCM). The Janus funds
were organized in accordance with industry practice, such that “while
each mutual fund [was] in fact its own company, as a practical matter
97
the management company [ran] it.” Therefore, the relationship
was less like the relationship between a company and its outside
advisors (such as its lawyers and accountants), and more akin to the
98
relationship between a corporation and its corporate insiders. For
91

Id. (emphasis added).
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14,
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09525), 2010 WL 4339892.
93
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303–04.
94
Id. at 2304.
95
Id. at 2305.
96
Id. at 2302 (“[W]e are mindful that we must give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a
right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did
not expand when it revisited the law.’”) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008)).
97
Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra
note 92, at 9 (citation omitted).
98
Id. at 9. As one critic of the Court’s decision pondered in disbelief: “Perhaps
92
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instance, it is typical in such relationships that the advisor creates the
mutual fund, selects the fund’s directors, manages its investments,
99
and provides other services. And since a mutual fund is “little more
100
than a paper shell containing its investors’ money,” any recovery
101
from JIF would be satisfied only from the investors’ own assets.
Therefore, ignoring the close relationship between JCM and JIF and,
consequently, not allowing plaintiffs to pursue a claim against JCM
102
left plaintiffs effectively without a remedy.
103
In some ways, the Janus holding is fairly limited. On its facts, it
only applies to a claim brought by private litigants, not the SEC. And
it applied only to a 10b-5 claim, not claims brought under a myriad of
other federal securities or states’ laws. Moreover, it only applied to
the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment advisor.
But in the aftermath of Janus, as the lower courts scramble to
interpret the ruling, they will be called upon to determine whether it
104
applies more broadly.
Thus far, most courts agree that the Janus
holding is not limited to private rights of action, but also applies to
105
SEC enforcement actions. But lower courts seem to be diverging in
the five prevailing justices actually believe that a Janus fund’s board could fire Janus
and hire T. Rowe Price to manage the fund as easily as it might replace its law firm,
transfer agent or any other ‘service provider.’” Henriques, supra note 86.
99
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 92, at 9.
100
Henriques, supra note 86.
101
Darryl P. Rains, Eugene Illovsky & Jay G. Baris, Investment Management: Janus
and its Impact on Mutual Funds, 25 INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 3 (2011) (“A
fund’s only assets, of course, are investor assets. Funds typically have no assets apart
from assets contributed by investors in exchange for shares issued by the fund. As a
result, any liability under Rule 10b-5 could be satisfied only from investors’ own
assets—which is probably not what plaintiffs would have in mind.”).
102
Editorial, So No One’s Responsible, supra note 86 (“Only the business trust set up
to hold the funds can be held liable, though it has no assets of its own to compensate
plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Which means that there is no one to sue for the misleading
prospectuses.”).
103
Rains et al., supra note 101, at 2.
104
As stated by one federal district court, the Janus holding “is not explicitly
limited to its facts.” Red River Res. Inc. v. Mariner Sys. Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHXFJM, 2012 WL 2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012).
105
See SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11-cv-116-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 695668,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012); SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); In re Textron, Inc. S’holders Derivative Litig., 811 F.
Supp. 2d 564, 574 (D.R.I. 2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6
(D. Neb. 2011). See also SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y 2011)
(“assuming arguendo that Janus’s holding applies to SEC enforcement actions” and
finding it satisfied); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (SEC
conceding “that Janus foreclosed its ability to assert a misstatement claim” since the
defendants did not have ultimate authority over the statement); In re Flannery,
Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *42 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011); Bryan

JEFFRIES (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/9/2013 8:14 AM

ISSUER LIABILITY POST-JANUS

509

their interpretations of other aspects of the Janus holding, much as
they did in the wake of Central Bank and Stoneridge. And the fact that
courts are applying Janus both to private suits and SEC actions makes
the answers to these developing questions all the more pertinent.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF JANUS: LIABILITY GAPS
One question courts have had to grapple with is whether Janus
should be extended beyond the mutual fund/investment advisor
relationship to other secondary actors or, even more broadly, to
corporate insiders. And if the ruling should be so extended, courts
must determine to what extent. Since the Court in Janus did not
define what it means to have “ultimate authority” over a
misstatement, applying the Janus holding to corporate insiders is a
complicated question and one to which the Supreme Court did not
106
provide obvious answers.
Additionally, courts will have to
determine what effect Janus has on plaintiffs’ ability to establish
scienter in 10b-5 claims. This will be as true in jurisdictions that have
historically accepted theories of collective scienter as it is in those that
reject such theories. Finally, courts must decide whether Janus
should be limited to 10b-5 actions or should also apply to claims
brought under other similar federal securities laws, such as Section
17(a) of the Securities Act. Again, the Janus opinion provides little
guidance in this regard. In Part III infra, this Article analyzes some of
the responses of the lower courts to these questions and the
implications of Janus as it is applied in cases that will begin to work
their way through the appellate process.

P. King, The Effects of an Undefined “Ultimate Authority” Standard for Rule 10B-5 Claims:
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 405, 430
(2012) (“[T]he Court did not provide one definition of the word ‘make’ for private
actions, and a separate definition for SEC actions.”). But see SEC v. Pentagon Capital
Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Janus was a private suit,
not an enforcement action brought by the SEC. . . . There is no indication that the
Court or Congress intended for actions brought by the SEC to be so limited.”);
Henriques, supra note 86 (“Federal district judges in Manhattan have come down on
opposite sides of the question of whether the Janus decision applies at all in
regulatory cases filed by the S.E.C. . . . “). The application of Janus to SEC
enforcement actions is not unlike what was seen in the aftermath of the Central Bank
decision. Though that case applied on its facts only to the private 10b-5 right of
action, it became generally accepted in the wake of the Court’s holding that it would
apply equally to SEC enforcement actions brought under Rule 10b-5. Gorman, supra
note 35, at 201.
106
Rains et al., supra note 101, at 2 (“Janus . . . establishes ‘ultimate authority’ as
the standard without ever identifying the source of that authority.”).
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A. Limitations of Liability on Corporate Insiders: The Importance of
Attribution
Critics of Janus have focused on the ways in which Janus, when
applied outside the mutual fund context, will limit the liability of
other secondary actors like auditors, underwriters, and lawyers—a
107
seemingly natural extension of the Janus ruling.
In addition to
limiting the liability of secondary actors, however, it does not take a
particularly broad reading of Janus to see how it will also potentially
108
limit the liability of corporate insiders. In fact, this was one of the
concerns expressed by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Janus. The
dissent pointed out that, under the majority’s rule, in the situation
where “guilty management writes a prospectus (for the board)
containing materially false statements and fools both board and
public into believing they are true,” no one would be liable because
no one on the management team was the “maker” of the
109
misstatements under Janus.
That is because it is the unknowing
board in this scenario that has ultimate authority over the issuance of
the statement, and not the members of management who actively
engaged in the fraud.
Corporate executives facing 10b-5 claims have begun to invoke
Janus “to argue that they are merely hired hands at their companies—
like the management company hired by a mutual fund” and, as such,
107

Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1078 (“Outside advisers are the traditional
gatekeepers of the securities markets, on whom investors rely to ensure complete and
accurate disclosure. Under the Janus standard, outside advisers do not face the
prospect of liability for their conduct under Section 10(b) and will remain
undeterred under the current legal regime.”); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP, PRIVATE
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 10(B) BASED ON FRAUD OR MISLEADING
STATEMENTS 1, 4 (2011), available at http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication
/b3ae77c9-1dc3-4bf4-a0c4-a5580c78376c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/048148f3-258c-43dc-9fb7-a5f31912ecb3/SC_Publication_Private_Securities_Fraud
_Claims_Under_Section_10b.pdf (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in Janus could
have significant implications for (i) those, such as accountants, consultants, and
attorneys, who help securities issuers prepare and publish public disclosures, and (ii)
those, such as advisers and corporate parents, that may be alleged to have significant
influence over an issuer’s business affairs and public disclosures.”); King, supra note
105, at 426 (“The initial effect is a major victory for outside advisors in that there is
now precedent and authority granting them de facto immunity from 10b-5 suits.”)
(citation omitted).
108
Rains, supra note 36, at 11 (“Janus may well have ended primary Rule 10b-5
liability for corporate officers and directors in most contexts. Usually, a corporation
will be the ‘maker’ of a statement. No individual will be exposed to primary liability
under Rule 10b-5, because no individual will have had ultimate authority over its
content or mode of communication.”).
109
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2310
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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are not liable for any fraudulent information disseminated by their
110
Though there seems to be little doubt that
corporate employers.
111
Janus applies to corporate insiders, courts are not at all uniform in
determining how it should apply.
For instance, some courts have found that there is no 10b-5
liability for insiders who merely participated in the preparation of the
false statements that ultimately appeared in public filings—these
112
insiders simply were not “makers” of the statements under Janus.
113
Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole is a good illustration of
this line of cases. In that case, the defendants were corporate officers
who had allegedly falsified financial information that was
incorporated into “overly optimistic public statements” made by
114
other officials of the corporation.
The court held that Janus
115
applied to corporate insiders as well as secondary actors, and found
that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the Janus requirement of showing
110

Henriques, supra note 86. Such arguments gain more traction in light of postJanus cases that have held there is no duty of one who assists in the preparation of
materials to correct any errors in the public transmission of such materials by the
person or entity with “ultimate authority” over that transmission. Fulton Cnty. Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d 1047, 1051–52 (7th Cir. 2012).
111
Most courts addressing the issue of whether Janus applies to situations
involving corporate insiders have assumed without discussion that it does. See, e.g., In
re Stillwater Capital Partners, Inc. Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 441, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., No. CV-09-8162-PCT-GMS, 2012 WL 1900560, at *5 (D.
Ariz. May 24, 2012); City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing
Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30,
2012); City of Roseville Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp.
2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28,
2011); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6
(D. Neb. 2011); In re Merck & Co., Sec, Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. 2:05-cv02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No.
C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011). Only a few
courts have specifically addressed the issue and expressly held that Janus applies. See,
e.g., Red River Res., Inc. v. Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL
2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012) (“The holding in Janus is not explicitly
limited to its facts. . . . courts have applied Janus to corporate insiders.”); Haw.
Ironworkers, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *3 (N.D. Oh. Sep. 1, 2011)
(“Plaintiff asserts that, ‘[i]n essence, Janus involves a secondary actor’ and thus ‘Janus
does not analyze whether corporate executives can be liable.’ . . . [But] nothing in
the Court’s decision in Janus limits the key holding . . . to legally separate entities.”).
112
Kerr v. Exobox Techs., CV No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *12 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 23, 2012); In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at
*41 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011); Haw. Ironworkers, 2011 WL 3862206, at *5; Mercury Interactive,
2011 WL 5871020, at *2.
113
Haw. Ironworkers, 2011 WL 3862206.
114
Id. at *1.
115
Id. at *3.
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that the defendants—corporate insiders—had “ultimate authority”
116
over the misstatements. The court pointed out that the defendants
were required to meet a mandatory six percent profit-margin increase
for the division for which they were in charge of financial reporting
117
to senior officers. They had “no choice” but to increase forecasts to
118
The defendants’ superiors,
meet the new six percent benchmark.
who ultimately incorporated the false forecasts into public
statements, knew that the six percent requirement was
“unobtainable” and therefore the underlying data would have to have
119
been manipulated to show compliance. Essentially, the defendants
had merely sent the results “they were commanded to send” and had
120
In other words,
no real authority over their issuance.
notwithstanding their fraudulent conduct, because they were not
“makers” under Janus, they were not liable.
In an administrative proceeding addressing the liability of
insiders, the SEC’s Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) went even
further in her refusal to impose 10b-5 liability on a corporate insider.
In In re Flannery, the ALJ determined that an insider would not be
liable for making five presentations to clients using a chart that he
121
knew included misrepresentations. The insider did not prepare the
presentation but he was asked to review and correct material in the
122
presentation, and he was responsible for giving the presentation.
The ALJ found that, though he was asked to make corrections in the
presentation, this did not give him ultimate authority over its
123
contents or distribution. Additionally, the insider prepared a draft
of a “client-friendly letter” which he sent to other management
124
professionals within the company.
When he circulated the letter,
116

Id. at *5.
Id. at *4.
118
Id.
119
Haw. Ironworkers, 2011 WL 3862206, at *4.
120
Id. at *5.
121
In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *38 (ALJ
Oct. 28, 2011) (initial decision).
122
Id.
123
Id. It should be noted that this outcome seems inconsistent with the use of
the speechwriter versus speech giver analogy used by the majority in Janus to justify
the “ultimate authority” test. Here, the insider was in fact the equivalent of the
“speech giver”—he gave the presentation in which the misrepresentations were
made. Yet the court found he was not the one with ultimate authority since he did
not prepare it—i.e., he was not the speechwriter. The result here seems directly
contrary to the Janus Court’s determination that it is the speech giver, not the writer,
who has ultimate authority. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.
Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
124
In re Flannery, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41.
117
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125

he stated that recipients could send it out or suggest improvements.
It was undisputed that the insider defendant did not have authority to
126
send the letter out, beyond circulating it internally. A senior officer
127
ultimately sent out the letter. Because the defendant did not send
the letter out to clients, did not sign the letter, and was not
mentioned in the letter, the ALJ found that he did not have ultimate
authority over the letter, and therefore could not be subject to 10b-5
128
liability.
Other courts, however, have imposed 10b-5 liability on corporate
insiders, finding their level of involvement in the preparation of the
public statement to be sufficient to consider them the individuals
with “ultimate authority” over the making of the misstatement,
129
thereby satisfying Janus. For instance, in In re Merck & Co. Securities,
Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, one of the defendants was an officer
of Merck, holding the positions of “Executive Vice President for
Science and Technology and President of Merck Research
130
Laboratories.”
He had signed some of Merck’s public filings with
131
the SEC and these filings contained misrepresentations.
Additionally, he had been quoted in articles and reports, conveying
132
The court held that
additional misrepresentations to the public.
the 10b-5 claim could proceed against this officer based on the
133
misrepresentations publicly attributed to him.
The distinguishing factor between most post-Janus cases dealing
125

Id.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
In re Stillwater, 853 F. Supp. 2d 441, 453 (S.D.N.Y 2012); Red River Res., Inc. v.
Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June
29, 2012); City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs.,
Inc., No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012); In
re Pfizer Inc., Sec. Litig, 2012 WL 983548, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); SEC v.
Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); City of Roseville Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc.,
814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL
4375787, at *6 (D. Neb. 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL
3295139, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); In re Merck & Co., Sec, Derivative & “ERISA”
Litig., No. 2:05-cv-02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 3444199, at *25–26 (D.N.J. Aug. 8,
2011); SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28,
2011); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y 2011); Local 703 I.B. of
T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 2011 US Dist. LEXIS
93873, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011).
130
In re Merck, 2011 WL 3444199, at *25.
131
Id. at *24–25.
132
Id.
133
Id. at *25.
126
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with corporate insiders—those finding potential liability and those
finding no liability—appears to be this issue of attribution. In other
words, the majority of cases that have found potential liability of
corporate insiders involve public statements that have in some way
been attributed to the corporate insider, such that the investing
public knows that person played a large role in the preparation of the
134
misstatements and is ultimately responsible for them. Courts have
justified these results by looking to the language of Janus itself, which,
at least in dicta, discusses the issue of attribution. Specifically, the
Supreme Court stated that “attribution within a statement or implicit
from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement
135
was made by . . . the party to whom it is attributed.” Therefore, the
interpretation by lower courts that an express attribution of a
statement to someone in a public filing identifies that person as the
“maker” of the statement seems reasonable.
But in addition to express attribution, the language from Janus
allowing for “implicit” attribution “from surrounding circumstances”
leaves open the possibility that courts may impose liability on
corporate insiders even in the absence of an express attribution in a
public statement to the individual insider defendant. At least two
post-Janus cases, each out of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
134

Compare Kerr v. Exobox Techs., CV No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *12
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2012) (holding that there was no information suggesting the
officer defendant contributed to the statement issued by another officer of the
corporation and therefore plaintiffs failed to properly plead a 10b-5 cause of action),
and In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41 (ALJ
Oct. 28, 2011) (holding that, though the defendant insider had drafted the letter
that was ultimately sent to investors, since the insider had no authority to send the
letter, did not sign the letter, and his name did not appear on it, he could not be
considered its maker), and City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (holding that
certain corporate insider defendants could not be liable partly because neither
signed the registration statement at issue), with Das, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 (“As the
CFOs who signed and certified the statements, [the defendant officers] were the
persons with ultimate authority and control over the content of the statements and
whether and how they were communicated.”), and In re Stillwater, 858 F. Supp. 2d at
287–88 (“Janus . . . cannot be used to shield [the officer], who signed the documents
at issue and thereby ‘made’ the alleged misstatements.”), and In re Flannery, 2011 WL
5130058, at *46 (holding that defendant could be considered the maker of
misstatements in a letter when “he initiated it, wrote the first draft, approved the
edits, signed it, and directed that it be sent out.”), and City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d
at 417 (“Because all of the [officer defendants] signed the July 2008 Registration
Statement, all are proper defendants on the claims regarding alleged misstatements
in that document.”).
135
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302
(2011). The Court went on to state that, when a statement is being “made”
indirectly, rather than directly, attribution is necessary to find that the defendant was
the maker. Id. at 2305 n.11.
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District of New York, have imposed liability in such scenarios. It is
likely that these two cases will be reversed on appeal because they
seem to adopt a meaning of “maker” that is the equivalent of
someone who is considered one of the “creators” of a statement—an
interpretation that was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in
137
In fact, it seems likely that appellate courts will find that
Janus.
these factual scenarios—involving an officer who participated in the
creation of a misstatement but to whom the misstatement was not
publicly attributed—are difficult to distinguish from claims of aiding
and abetting, which are limited to SEC enforcement actions and are
138
not available to private litigants. Regardless of outcome on appeal,
the question will likely remain as to what constitutes “implicit”
attribution capable of satisfying Janus.
It is not just the cases involving implicit attribution that are at
risk on appeal. Even the cases described above that allow explicit
attribution to satisfy Janus might ultimately be reversed. Litigants
have argued, for example, that under Janus, even express attribution
139
is not sufficient, but rather the test is one of control. Therefore, for
136

In re Pfizer Inc., Sec. Litig, 2012 WL 983548, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012)
(holding that, even though the statements in the company’s press releases were not
explicitly attributed to the insider defendants, the case could proceed against the
defendants since Janus recognized attribution could be “implicit from surrounding
circumstances”); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (holding
that the plaintiffs’ claim could proceed against an insider executive who had
generated fraudulent materials that misrepresented the company’s financial
performance but who had not been identified in any of the public
misrepresentations as their author since there were adequate surrounding
circumstances to conclude the misstatements were implicitly attributable to the
defendant). .
137
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303–04 (“The Government contends that ‘make’ should
be defined as ‘create.’ . . . Adopting the Government’s definition of ‘make’ would . . .
lead to results inconsistent with our precedent. The Government’s definition would
permit private plaintiffs to sue a person who ‘provides the false or misleading
information that another person then puts into the statement.’”). .
138
See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.
139
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, SEC v. Daifotis, No. 11-cv00137-WHA, 2012 WL 2848995 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012). While control may in fact
be relevant to the inquiry, control alone as we think of it in the corporate context—
e.g., a parent controls its one-hundred percent owned subsidiary—is not enough to
satisfy the “ultimate authority” test of Janus. For instance, in In re Optimal U.S.
Litigation, Optimal Management Services (“OIS”) owned one-hundred percent of
Optimal Multiadvisors, Ltd. (“Multiadvisors”).
No. 10-cv-4095-SAS, 2011 WL
4908745, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011). The plaintiffs asserted OIS participated in
the preparation of certain explanatory memoranda made available to investors by
Multiadvisors.
Id.
Since these explanatory memoranda contained material
misrepresentations, the plaintiffs brought a 10b-5 claim against OIS. Id. at *1. The
court held that, just because OIS owned one-hundred percent of Multiadvisors and
was able to appoint and remove Multiadvisors’ directors at will, this was not sufficient
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instance, where a defendant insider is quoted in marketing materials,
but claims not to have made the quoted statement, the only potential
defendants would be the individuals who actually drafted and issued
the marketing materials, despite the public attribution of the
140
statement to the defendant insider.
This argument seems to go
against the majority of the lower court decisions analyzing the effect
of express attribution as described above. The argument may gain
traction, however, as attribution alone certainly does not seem to be
the equivalent of the “ultimate authority” the Janus holding demands
before an individual will be deemed the maker of a statement. While
the Janus language refers to attribution as being “strong evidence”
141
that a person was the maker of a statement, it may not be sufficient
standing alone as the only evidence to satisfy the “ultimate authority”
test.
This argument that attribution alone is insufficient to satisfy
Janus is not the only potential cause for reversal of the lower court
decisions that have allowed 10b-5 claims to proceed against corporate
insiders.
Litigants may also argue that Janus stands for the
proposition that there can be only one “maker” of a misstatement,
further limiting the liability of the team of corporate insiders often
involved in public disclosures. The language in Janus regarding
attribution states that attribution is strong evidence that a statement
142
“was made by—and only by—the party to whom it is attributed.”
Some have interpreted this to mean that there can be only one
person or entity liable for a particular misstatement in a
143
misrepresentation disclosed to investors.
Though lower courts do
144
not appear to be adopting this interpretation, most courts have
to satisfy the Janus test. Id. at *5. The court found that plaintiffs were “conflating
shareholder control with ‘ultimate authority’” and found such argument to be
unavailing. Id. at *5. While such “control” through one-hundred percent ownership
of an issuer could be sufficient to establish control person liability under Section
20(a) of the Exchange Act, a claim for control person liability is considered a
secondary action that requires an underlying primary violation by the controlled
person or entity in order to be actionable. Id. at *4, *8.
140
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 139 at 5.
141
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
142
Id.
143
James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar: The Supreme Court Turns Away Another
Securities Law Plaintiff, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 463, 495–96 (2012) (“[N]othing in logic or
linguistics compels the conclusion that a statement, or indeed anything else, has to
have one and only one ‘maker.’ The Court’s ‘either-or’ approach is thus illfounded.”); Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1074 (“Janus . . . limit[s] liability under section
10(b) to the person or entity with ‘ultimate authority’ over the statement.”)
(emphasis added).
144
In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enter. Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828, 861 (S.D. Ohio 2012)
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ignored the issue and seem simply to assume without deciding that
there can be more than one maker. If, as these cases work their way
through the appeals process, the circuit courts determine there can
be only one “maker” of a statement under Janus, either the corporate
entity or the corporate insider could be liable, but not both.
Moreover, presumably only one corporate insider could be liable for
a given misrepresentation, ignoring the realities of the marketplace—
that public disclosures “reflect a combined work product” of
145
potentially numerous individual wrongdoers.
As indicated by the above discussion, many questions still remain
for courts addressing the issue of individual liability in the post-Janus
world. Notably, even if circuit courts agree that express attribution is
sufficient to establish an insider as a maker of a statement, courts will
146
need to decide what kinds of actions constitute express attribution.
For instance, in In re Flannery, described in more detail above, the ALJ
seemed to indicate attribution was important when she refused to
impose liability on a defendant who drafted a letter, but was not the
147
one who signed it or sent it out.
Yet, in that same case, the ALJ
found no liability for the defendant who gave a presentation but was
148
It would seem as though, by giving a
not the one who created it.
presentation, one would be publicly identifying himself as the maker
(rejecting the defendant’s “either-or” contention that the document containing the
misstatement could only belong to the issuer or its placement agent and finding that
it was appropriate to find that the misstatements could be attributed to both parties);
City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 359,
374 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“It is not inconsistent with Janus Capital to presume that
multiple people in a single corporation have the joint authority to ‘make’ an SEC
filing, such that a misstatement has more than one ‘maker.’”); City of Roseville
Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The Supreme Court’s statement does not imply that there can be
only one ‘maker’ of a statement in the case of express or implicit attribution.”).
145
Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1050. One critic of this potential implication of
Janus that there may be only one “maker” has analogized this issue to other areas of
law. Redwood, supra note 143, at 496. For instance, in the case of tort liability arising
from an injury incurred from faulty construction, courts allow for plaintiffs to pursue
anyone who was responsible for the injury. Id. In other words, courts do not engage
in the fictional assumption that there can be only one maker of a building. Id. If the
injury is caused by something defective in both design and construction, for
example, a plaintiff could pursue both the architect and the contractor. Id. The
dissent in Janus similarly analogized to other areas of law, focusing specifically on
criminal law. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed
out that pursuant to criminal law principals, one is guilty as a principal “when one
uses an innocent third party to commit a crime.” Id.
146
Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7.
147
In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41 (ALJ
Oct. 28, 2011).
148
Id. at *38.
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of the statements contained therein, but this was not the case
149
according to the ALJ. If making a presentation (or giving a speech,
to use the analogy asserted by the majority in Janus) is not enough to
satisfy attribution, courts will have to identify what additional facts are
required.
Similarly, courts will have to determine whether a SarbanesOxley (SOX) Section 302 certification constitutes express attribution
150
for purposes of determining ultimate authority.
In a large
organization, the realities of the process of preparing corporate
disclosure filings are such that, though one person may sign the
disclosure documents, the responsibility for the language and
151
content of such filings may lie with a team of individuals. As such,
courts will have to determine whether liability can be imposed on a
CFO, for instance, solely because of his signature on a filing pursuant
to SOX requirements.
At least one court has addressed this issue since Janus. In City of
St. Clair Shores General Employees’ Retirement System v. Lender Processing
Services, Inc., the court viewed the signing of SOX certifications as
direct attribution sufficient to satisfy Janus, at least when combined
with the other facts that some of the individual defendants had made
152
statements quoted in press releases in their official capacities.
But this approach is not without critics, who note that SOX
153
certifications do not always indicate ultimate authority.
149

Id.
Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7. Under SOX, senior executives of public
companies must certify the accuracy of quarterly and annual financial reports. 15
U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2006). Each officer must certify that he and other officers are
“responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls[,]” which they have
designed “to ensure that material information” of the issuer will be reported “to such
officers by others within” the entity. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)(A). Moreover, the
officers must certify that they have “evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal
controls” within the previous ninety days and have “presented in the report their
conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls.” 15 U.S.C. §
7241(a)(4)(C)–(D).
151
Scott M. Himes, Implications of “Janus” for Securities Fraud Liability of Corporate
Insiders, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticle
NY.jsp?id=1202520766667&slreturn=20130217160926; King, supra note 105, at 426.
152
City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc.,
No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012).
153
Rains, supra note 36, at 11 (“It could be argued that some corporate
statements are attributable . . . to corporate directors or executives. For example,
chief executives and chief financial officers sign Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, chief
executives and chief accounting officers sign periodic reports, directors sign
registration statements, and executives make oral statements to investors or the
public. But a signature on a disclosure document rarely means the signer had
ultimate control over the document or the power to change its contents, and
150
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Additionally, even if public attribution—such as the signing of a SOX
certification—is enough to satisfy the “ultimate authority” test, it is
not at all clear that such claims could be successful at trial based on
154
an inability to establish the scienter necessary for a 10b-5 claim. For
instance, if a CFO signs a SOX certification for filings prepared by
other corporate officers or employees, where those preparers knew of
the misstatements in the materials but the CFO did not, a plaintiff
will have a difficult time establishing the scienter of the CFO. Prior
to Janus, some circuits held that a SOX certification is “only probative
of scienter if the person signing the certification was severely reckless
155
in certifying the accuracy of the financial statements.” According to
such courts, if a SOX certification alone, with nothing more, was
enough to provide the requisite inference of scienter, scienter would
automatically be adequately pled any time “it is alleged that an
accounting error . . . made by a publicly traded company was later
156
uncovered.”
Even if the plaintiff can establish that the defendant
should have known of the violations, according to these courts it is
insufficient to meet the heightened pleading requirements for
157
scienter in 10b-5 cases.
Thus, it follows that if the CFO in this
scenario is the “maker” of the statement for purposes of Janus, but
only the employee who prepared the materials to give to the CFO has
the requisite state of mind, plaintiffs will be unable to identify a
proper 10b-5 defendant. Though courts are willing to impute
158
scienter of an individual wrongdoer to the issuer itself, as discussed
suggestions that any one signer might have veto power are often overblown.”).
154
See supra note 30 and accompanying text for the elements of a 10b-5 claim.
155
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006). See also
Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Garfield in holding that SOX certification is only relevant to scienter if the person
signing was severely reckless); Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw
Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 544–45 (5th Cir. 2008) (same).
156
Stevens v. InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 105, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2009). While a
plaintiff may be able to use the fact that defendants failed to check information they
had a duty to monitor in order to support a showing of scienter, scienter cannot be
established by the “bare inference [alone that the] defendant ‘must have had
knowledge of the facts.’” Id. at 120 (citation omitted). Therefore, filing a SOX
certification alone is insufficient to adequately plead scienter and to hold otherwise
would “eviscerate the heightened pleading requirement[s]” of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Id. (citation omitted). The requirements of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act are described in more detail infra Part
III.B.1.
157
Glazer, 549 F.3d at 748. Heightened pleading requirements for scienter were
instituted by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, described in more detail
infra Part III.B.1.
158
There is precedent for imputing the scienter of an individual, and in some
jurisdictions a group of individuals, to the corporate entity by which the individual is
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in more detail in Part III.B.1 infra, scienter of one corporate insider
159
cannot be imputed to a different insider.
Factual scenarios such as this can already be seen in the cases
currently working their way through the lower courts and SEC
administrative proceedings. For instance, in In re Flannery, described
above, the defendant did not have ultimate authority over a letter
because he did not send it out or sign it, nor was he identified as its
160
author. Yet he was the individual who prepared the contents of the
161
draft letter and circulated it to more senior managers.
In such
scenarios, if the person who signed and sent the letter—and thus had
“ultimate authority”—did not know of the falsity of the letter’s
contents, such individual would not likely be found liable for a 10b-5
violation due to a lack of scienter.
In sum, it is possible that on appeal, circuit courts will determine
one or more of the following: (a) express attribution, on its own, is
not enough to satisfy the Janus “ultimate authority” test or, if it is,
what constitutes “express attribution” is very limited; (b) there can
only be one “maker” of a misstatement after Janus; or (c) an
unknowing officer who signs a public filing, while the “maker” of the
statement, does not have scienter sufficient to establish a 10b-5 claim.
One or more of these findings—particularly in combination—could
be devastating to the 10b-5 cause of action. Such limitations could
make it nearly impossible for private litigants or the SEC to assert
claims against corporate insiders. Combined with the challenges
Janus poses for bringing suits against secondary actors, potential
plaintiffs are left with only the remedy of pursuing the issuer itself.
And, as discussed in Part III.B. infra, even the ability to pursue the
issuer may be significantly limited by Janus.
B. Limitations of Liability on Corporate Issuers: Inability to Impute
Scienter
Janus not only potentially limits the 10b-5 liability of corporate
insiders and secondary actors, but, when combined with previously
existing precedent, may also limit the liability of even the corporate
employed in 10b-5 suits against the corporate issuer. See infra note 182 and
accompanying text.
159
Therefore, in this scenario where the CFO is the maker but another employee
has the scienter, if courts were to impute the employee’s scienter to the CFO, rather
than to the corporation itself, this would have to involve an expansion of the concept
of imputed scienter.
160
In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41 (ALJ
Oct. 28, 2011).
161
Id.
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issuers in whose name the misrepresentation was made. This is
because, as discussed in more detail in this Part, many courts will only
impute the scienter of an individual agent within the corporation to
the corporation itself if that individual with the requisite state of
mind is also the individual who was the maker of the misstatement.
In such jurisdictions—i.e., those that reject the theory of “collective
scienter”—it may be only in the most limited of circumstances that a
plaintiff will be able to successfully plead that the corporation had the
required state of mind for a 10b-5 claim. In these jurisdictions, cases
in which the lower courts have allowed the plaintiffs to proceed
against the issuer based on express attribution of a public statement
to a particular individual may be reversed on appeal for failure to
162
establish the scienter of the identified individual insiders. If this is
the case, not only will plaintiffs be barred from pursuing culpable
individuals, but they also would be barred from pursuing the
corporation itself. In other words, plaintiffs will be left with no
remedy at all.
1. Pleading an Issuer’s Scienter in 10b-5 Cases
As discussed in Part II.B. supra, scienter is a necessary element in
both private causes of action and SEC enforcement actions asserting
163
10b-5 liability. To establish scienter, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant had “a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
164
manipulate, or defraud.”
To understand the issue of imputed
scienter and collective scienter, it is necessary to first understand the
special pleading requirements for establishing scienter in 10b-5 cases.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss on a 10b claim, in addition to
satisfying the pleading requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), a plaintiff must also satisfy the
165
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the FRCP. Rule
9(b) requires that a party alleging fraud “state with particularity the
166
As such, the plaintiff must,
circumstances constituting fraud.”
162

See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
164
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976); see also Frank v.
Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Scienter may take the form of
knowing and deliberate intent to manipulate, deceive, or defraud, and
recklessness.”) (citation omitted); Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective
Scienter in SEC Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 2 (2009) (“Scienter
generally refers to intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.”).
165
SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
166
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Where fraud is not at issue, the federal notice pleading
standards of FED. R. CIV. P. 8 apply, which merely require that a complaint contain a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
163
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among other things, specify the fraudulent statements, explain why
167
Initially, courts of
they are fraudulent, and identify the speaker.
appeals diverged with regard to the meaning of Rule 9(b) in 10b
cases, particularly with respect to its effect on the pleading
168
requirements for scienter.
For instance, some courts found it was
sufficient merely to plead that scienter existed, while other courts
required plaintiffs to allege particular facts giving rise to the
169
inference of scienter.
In 1995, Congress attempted to clarify this
disagreement through the enactment of the Private Securities
170
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).
One of the purposes of enacting the PSLRA was to curb abusive
securities litigation while still allowing meritorious suits to proceed to
171
enforce federal antifraud securities laws.
Through the PSLRA,
Congress effectuated this goal by, among other things, imposing
certain demanding pleading requirements. For instance, the PSLRA
establishes a more stringent rule for inferences involving scienter in
172
securities litigation.
Specifically, with respect to scienter, the
PSLRA requires that the plaintiff “state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
173
state of mind.”
At the time it enacted the PSLRA, however,
Congress left the meaning of “strong inference” undefined, leading
174
to a division in the circuit courts as to how it should be interpreted.
For instance, the Seventh Circuit took a more lenient approach to
the pleading requirement, finding that a complaint would survive if it
alleged facts from which a reasonable person could infer the
175
defendant acted with the requisite intent. The Sixth Circuit, on the
other hand, took a more strict approach, finding that a complaint
would only survive if the plaintiff asserted the most plausible of
176
competing inferences.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender
Processing Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 30, 2012).
167
Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
168
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319–20 (2007).
169
Id.
170
Id. at 320.
171
Id. at 313, 322.
172
Id. at 313–14.
173
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006).
174
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314.
175
Id. at 317.
176
Id. In other words, the issue came down to whether courts should consider
competing inferences in determining whether an inference of scienter is considered
“strong” for purposes of the statute. Id. at 322.
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In 2007, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Tellabs,
177
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
In Tellabs, the Supreme Court
adopted the more strict of the competing interpretations of the
PSLRA’s scienter pleading requirement, holding that a plaintiff must
plead facts that make the inference more than merely plausible or
178
reasonable.
Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts that render an
inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing
179
inference. In so holding, the Court also stated that it must consider
the complaint in its entirety because the question is whether all of the
facts taken collectively give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not
180
whether any individual allegation meets that standard.
If the
pleading requirements of the PSLRA are not met, a court must grant
181
a defendant’s motion to dismiss.
2. Imputing Scienter to the Corporation
When the defendant in a 10b-5 action is the corporation itself,
typically the easiest way to raise an inference of scienter is to plead
182
scienter for a particular individual within the corporation.
The
scienter of the individual wrongdoer, an agent of the corporation,
183
can then be imputed to the corporation. In other words, courts are
generally in agreement that, when the corporate insider who made
the misrepresentation acted with scienter, that scienter can be
imputed to his or her corporate employer to establish the elements of
184
a 10b-5 claim against the issuer itself.
The more problematic question historically has been whether
scienter can be imputed to the corporation from a group of insiders,
where the one particular wrongdoer within the corporation is not the
185
“maker” of the misstatement or has not necessarily been identified.
The willingness of courts to impute scienter of an individual
177

551 U.S. 308 (2007).
Id. at 314.
179
Id. at 328.
180
Id. at 322–23.
181
City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc.,
No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012). It
should be noted that the heightened pleading requirements set forth in the PSLRA
apply only to private causes of action, not to enforcement actions filed by the SEC. 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2006); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
182
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d
190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).
183
Bondi, supra note 164, at 2–3.
184
Id.
185
Id.
178
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corporate agent to the corporation itself has evolved out of theories
186
But respondeat superior as a theory does
of respondeat superior.
not work when the individual who engaged in the act itself—such as
making a false statement—is not the same person as the one who has
187
scienter. As such, plaintiffs have argued that the scienter of one or
a collection of corporate agents should be combined to establish the
188
required state of mind of the corporation itself.
Courts willing to
do this—to impute scienter to the corporation from the assumed
collective knowledge of all or some combination of its employees—
have done so under a theory that has been referred to as “collective
189
scienter.”
Essentially three lines of cases have developed with respect to
collective scienter—those that apply a strong version of collective
scienter, those that apply a “watered-down” version of collective
190
scienter, and those that reject collective scienter altogether. Under
the strong version of collective scienter, courts allow plaintiffs to
plead scienter based on the aggregate knowledge of all of the
employees of a corporation without pleading scienter to any
191
particular corporate agent.
For instance, when a corporation
makes a dramatic announcement that is wildly false, this supports an
inference of scienter because such an announcement would have had
to have been approved by corporate insiders who had enough
knowledge about the company to know the announcement was
192
false.
Other courts have not rejected collective scienter outright but
have applied a more limited version of the theory. These courts find
that, so long as a specific “member of management knew or should
have known” that a statement was false, the scienter can be imputed
to the corporation, even where “that member of management was

186

Id.
Id. at 7.
188
Id.
189
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d
190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008). See also Bondi, supra note 164, at 3. Some courts have
applied the functional equivalent of a collective scienter theory without labeling it as
such. See, e.g., City of Monroe Emps. Retirement Syst. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d
651, 684 (6th Cir. 2005). Additionally, some courts refer to a similar theory of
“group pleading.” Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353,
363 (5th Cir. 2004).
190
Bondi, supra note 164, at 7.
191
Id. at 10. See also City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 684; Teamsters Local 445, 531 F.3d
at 195.
192
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008).
187
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not the person who made the alleged misstatement.”
In other
words, instead of allowing scienter to be imputed from the aggregate
knowledge of all of the employees, courts in these jurisdictions
require the plaintiff to show that at least one member of
management knew or should have known of the falsity before the bad
194
actor’s state of mind will be imputed to the issuer.
Finally, at least six circuits have rejected collective scienter
altogether, instead requiring that, to impute scienter from an
individual to the corporation, the individual with scienter must also
195
be the same individual who actually made the misstatement. Even
jurisdictions that were once friendly to notions of collective scienter
have subsequently questioned whether the theory survived the
196
adoption of the PSLRA in 1995. Some courts have interpreted the
PSLRA, in combination with the Tellabs holding, as requiring that
plaintiffs attribute the misleading statements upon which the 10b-5
197
claim is based to a particular defendant. For instance, in Southland
Securities Corporation v. INSpire Insurance Solutions, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
held that collective scienter cannot survive in light of the PSLRA,
focusing on the PSLRA’s language requiring the plaintiff to set forth
198
allegations of misstatements with respect to “the defendant.”
The
repeated references in the PSLRA’s pleading requirements to “the
defendant,” according to the court, must be read to mean “each
193

Bondi, supra note 164, at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
195
Id. at 7. The Eleventh, First, Third, Ninth, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits have all
rejected collective scienter. Id. at 8, n.27; see, e.g., Stevens v. InPhonic, Inc., 662 F.
Supp. 2d 105, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions,
Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 364–65 (6th Cir. 2005); Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d
1015, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d
736, 745 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that collective scienter would not satisfy the PSLRA
in the case before it, but declining to decide whether, in some circumstances, it
might be possible to plead scienter under a collective theory); Part III.B.1 supra.
196
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326, n.6. See also Monk v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 10-4841FLW, 2011 WL 6339824, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2011) (“[T]he Third Circuit made
[it] clear . . . that the so-called group pleading doctrine is no longer viable, and any
private securities fraud claims against corporate officers ‘must be pleaded with the
specificity required by the PLSRA with respect to each defendant.’”) (quoting Winer
Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 337 (3d Cir. 2007)). Since the heightened
pleading requirements for scienter established by the PSLRA only apply to private
10b-5 claims and not to SEC enforcement actions, however, it is unclear whether
collective scienter as a theory would be available to the SEC even in jurisdictions that
otherwise refuse to recognize such claims. Until at least 2009, all of the judicial
decisions involving collective scienter involved private claims, not SEC enforcement
actions. Bondi, supra note 164, at 4.
197
In re Coinstar Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C11-133-MJP, 2011 WL 4712206, at *3 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 6, 2011).
198
Southland, 365 F.3d at 364.
194
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defendant,” thereby eliminating the ability to plead scienter based on
199
the aggregate of individuals within a corporation. Additionally, the
court held that even if a corporate insider’s position within the
corporation supports an inference that he would have been negligent
in not learning of the falsity in the document that was released to the
public, the PSLRA requires more than negligence to satisfy the
200
scienter requirement for 10b-5 liability.
In so holding, the court in Southland made it clear that, in the
Fifth Circuit, allegations against defendants as a group are not
imputable to any individual defendant (such as the corporation)
unless the connection between the individual defendant and the
201
misstatement is properly pleaded. To ensure that the connection is
“properly pleaded,” the plaintiff must plead with particularity facts
showing the state of mind “of the individual corporate official or
officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or
its making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for
202
Ultimately, the knowledge
inclusion therein, or the like).”
necessary to form the requisite intent cannot be imputed to the
corporation based on “disconnected facts known by different
203
agents.”
Janus will potentially have an effect in jurisdictions that
historically have permitted theories of collective scienter. For
instance, in such jurisdictions, a split may be developing over whether
collective scienter can survive Janus or whether such jurisdictions
204
must now reject the theory.
Even in jurisdictions that have
199

Id. at 364–65.
Id. at 365–66; see also Fulton Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d
1047, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The most the complaint’s allegation could support is
the proposition that [the corporation’s] managers should have seen the looming
problem, but that’s negligence rather than the state of mind required for fraud.”); In
re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828, 866 (S.D. Ohio 2012)
(“Negligence does not suffice; there must be ‘an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care,’ such that the danger of misleading buyers is ‘either
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of
it.’”) (quoting Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1991)).
201
Southland, 365 F.3d at 365.
202
Id. at 366.
203
Id. at 367 (quoting Gutter v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1291,
1311 (S.D. Fla. 2000)).
204
For instance, one lower court in the Second Circuit has asserted that “group
pleading is alive and well” in the aftermath of Janus. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.
Retirement Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11-cv-5026-JSR, 2012 WL 2866425, at
*14 (S.D.N.Y. July. 13, 2012). Another lower court, however, has stated that “it is
uncertain whether [the group pleading doctrine] survived Janus.” Orlan v.
Spongetech Delivery Sys., Inc., 2012 WL 1067975, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2012).
200
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historically refused to allow plaintiffs to use collective scienter
theories to establish corporate scienter, the effect of Janus moving
forward is of equal importance. To illustrate, in Southland, as
discussed above, the court held that scienter would only be imputed
if the person with the requisite state of mind was also the person who
205
Prior to Janus, several individuals could be
made the statement.
viewed as having “made” the statement. But after Janus, the sphere of
individuals who can be considered to have “made” the statement has
206
shrunk, as discussed in Parts II.E and III.A supra. Therefore, if the
employee who had knowledge of the falsity of the statements being
issued is not the same person as the employee with “ultimate
authority” over the statements, the scienter of the individual cannot
be imputed to the corporation. In such instances, not only will a
plaintiff be unable to pursue a claim against the individual “maker,”
but the plaintiff will also be without a remedy against the corporation
itself.
To illustrate this point further with a hypothetical, assume the
V.P. of Finance of Corporation X supplies false financial data to the
CFO of Corporation X to include in the company’s public filings.
The CFO neither knows, nor has reason to know, that the
information is false. Corporation X makes the filings, which contain
the CFO’s signature. After Janus, the V.P. of Finance likely cannot be
pursued under 10b-5 as the maker of the statement. That leaves only
the individual CFO or the corporation itself, either of which—or
both, if Janus is read to allow for more than one maker—could
arguably be seen as the statement’s maker. But the V.P. of Finance is
the only individual with the requisite scienter and, in jurisdictions
disallowing collective scienter, this scienter cannot be imputed to the
corporation or the CFO. Jurisdictions rejecting collective scienter
have made it clear that the fact that the plaintiff can show that a
different executive—someone other than who made the
misstatement—knew about the falsity of the statements would do
207
nothing to save that plaintiff’s claim from dismissal.
Arguably, some of the cases from jurisdictions rejecting
collective scienter can be read more broadly than the above
discussion would suggest. For instance, in Southland, the court does
not limit the individual from whom the scienter can be imputed to
the maker of the statement alone. Rather the court states that it will
look to the state of mind of the officials who made the statement and
205
206
207

Southland, 365 F.3d at 366.
Rains, supra note 36, at 12.
Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2008).
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to those who “order[ed] or approve[d]” the issuance of the
statement, or who “furnish[ed] information or language” to include
208
This would allow scienter to be imputed to the
in the statement.
corporation even if the plaintiff was unable to establish that the
individual with scienter was the same person who had ultimate
209
authority over that statement for purposes of Janus.
But other
courts rejecting collective scienter have not used the broad language
used by the Fifth Circuit in Southland. For instance, the Ninth
Circuit, in rejecting collective scienter in Glazer Capital Management,
LP v. Magistri, said that scienter can only be imputed from the
individual to the corporation if the “officer making the statement has
210
the requisite level of scienter.” Moreover, in the aftermath of Janus,
many courts have yet to test whether corporate scienter could be
inferred from those who merely “furnish[ed] information or
language” to the maker of the statement. It would not require an
overly broad reading of Janus and the collective scienter cases to
211
conclude that it could not.
Because Janus may do away with theories of collective scienter
altogether, the prediction of the dissent in Janus may in fact come to
fruition, where “guilty management” could incorporate “materially
false statements” into public filings and “fool[] both board and
212
public into believing they are true.”
Not only would it be
impossible for a plaintiff to assert a claim against the individuals—i.e.,
the guilty management—but in a jurisdiction that rejects collective
scienter, it may also be impossible for a plaintiff to assert a claim
against the issuer itself. The majority in Janus used the analogy of the
relationship between a speechwriter and speech giver to support its
holding that it is the speech giver, not the speechwriter, who has
213
ultimate authority over the communication.
But it is easy to see
how this analogy breaks apart when viewed in light of the other
elements of a 10b-5 action—in reality, the speech giver often does not
208

Southland, 365 F.3d at 366.
Thus, in the above-described hypothetical, the scienter of the V.P. of Finance
might be imputed to the corporation since the V.P. of Finance furnished
information to the CFO for inclusion in the public statement.
210
Glazer, 549 F.3d at 744 (quoting Apple Computer Inc., Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp.
2d 1012, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). In other words, Glazer does not allow imputing
scienter from those who merely furnished information or language to include in the
statement.
211
Rains, supra note 36, at 12 n.14 (“Southland’s logic seems to limit the state of
mind inference to the corporate officials who ‘make’ a statement within the meaning
of Janus.”). In other words, the broad language in Southland might not survive Janus.
212
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213
Id. at 2302.
209
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have the requisite scienter.
C. Expansion of Janus Beyond 10b-5 Claims
Janus may serve to limit the liability of secondary parties,
corporate insiders, and corporate issuers even further through its
application to claims brought under federal securities laws other than
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b). For instance, lower courts have
had to address whether Janus applies only to claims of
misrepresentation brought under Rule 10b-5(b) or whether it also
should apply to cases involving scheme liability brought under Rule
10b-5(a) or 10b-5(c). In SEC v. Kelly, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that Janus would apply in cases of
scheme liability that involve defendants “who did no more than
facilitate preparation of material misrepresentations or omissions
214
actually communicated by others.”
Other courts have had the opportunity to determine whether
Janus extends even beyond Rule 10b-5. For example, a handful of
lower courts have had to opine on whether Janus should be extended
215
to claims brought under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act. Under
Section 17(a), it is unlawful:
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission [of] material
fact . . . or (3) to engage in any . . . course of business
which . . . would operate as a fraud . . . upon the
216
purchaser.
Litigants arguing in favor of applying Janus to 17(a) claims point
out that the elements of a claim under 17(a) are essentially the same
217
And to succeed in a 17(a) claim for
as those under 10b-5.
misstatement, the SEC must prove that the defendant made
materially false statements or omissions, just as it would have to prove
218
if it were bringing a misstatement claim under 10b-5.
In fact, the
214

SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted).
SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07-C-4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *14–15
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377,
421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Perry, No. CV-11-1309R, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8
(C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA,
2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137
WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at
345.
216
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006).
217
Reply Brief in Support of Daifotis’s Motion for Reconsideration at 12, SEC v.
Dafoitis, No. 11-cv-00137-WHA, 2011 WL 7095660 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011).
218
Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345; SEC v. Trabulse, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1004
215
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SEC’s primary purpose in adopting 10b-5 was to make the same
prohibitions contained in 17(a), which applies in connection with the
offer and sale of a security, applicable to purchases of securities as
219
well.
Conversely, litigants arguing that Janus should not apply to
Section 17(a) claims generally point out that the operative word in
10b-5 that was the subject of the Janus ruling—”make”—is not even
220
included in Section 17(a).
Rather under Section 17(a), it is
unlawful for one “to obtain” money or property “by means of” any
221
Nowhere
untrue statement that is used to perpetrate the fraud.
does Section 17(a) require that it be the one who obtains the money
or property be the same as the one who has made the untrue
222
statement.
Moreover, since Janus is silent with respect to 17(a)
223
claims, the holding should not be extended to that provision.
Some litigants have also looked to the policy underlying the Janus
decision, arguing that Janus was aimed at narrowing the definition of
“make” under Rule 10b-5 so as to curb the expansion of private suits
224
under that rule.
Since only the SEC can bring actions under
Section 17(a), however, there is no concern of expansion of the
private right of action, and therefore the Janus definition of “make”
225
should not be applied.
At the time of writing this Article, most district courts that have
considered the issue have refused to apply Janus to Section 17(a)
226
claims. But at least two courts have held that the Janus requirement
that the “maker” of a statement be the one with “ultimate authority”

(N.D. Cal. 2007).
219
Reply Brief in Support of Daifotis’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note
217, at 12.
220
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Daifotis’s Motion for
Reconsideration at 9, SEC v. Daifotis, No. 11-cv-00137-WHA, 2011 WL 7095645 (N.D.
Cal. July 6, 2011); see also Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5; Mercury Interactive, 2011
WL 5871020, at *3.
221
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
222
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Daifotis’s Motion for
Reconsideration, supra note 220, at 10 (citing SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 128
(1st Cir. 2008)) (“[P]rimary liability may attach under Section 17(a)(2) even when
the defendant has not himself made a false statement in connection with the offer or
sale of a security.”).
223
Id. at 9.
224
Id. at 11.
225
Id.
226
See, e.g., SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07-C-4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at
*14–15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp.
2d 377, 421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 1100137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).
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over it applies to misstatement claims brought under 17(a)(2), just as
227
it would apply to claims brought under 10b-5(b). The issue is still
largely untested as only a handful of district courts have as yet
analyzed the issue.
While the question of application of Janus to Section 17(a)
claims has thus far received the greatest amount of attention, litigants
have also argued that Janus should apply to claims brought under two
other federal securities laws—Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and
Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act.
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act proscribes the solicitation of
228
proxies “by means of” false or misleading statements. To date, one
court has addressed whether Janus should be extended to Section
14(a) claims. In S.E.C. v. Mercury, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California held that Janus does not apply to
claims brought under Section 14(a) because the language of the
229
Similarly, at least one
statute does not include the word “make.”
court has refused to extend Janus to claims brought under Section
230
34(b) of the Investment Company Act.
Section 34(b) makes it
“unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material
fact in any registration statement, application, report, account,
231
record, or other document filed or transmitted.”
Though the
language of Section 34(b) includes the operative word “make,” in
S.E.C. v. Daifotis, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California held that Janus should still not apply because that case was
232
limited to primary violations of Rule 10b-5.
The rationale behind
the Janus decision focused largely on the need to limit the scope of
233
the implied private right of action. Since there is no private right of
action under Section 34(b), the same rationale does not apply,
234
according to the court.
While most courts addressing this issue have determined that
Janus should not be extended outside of 10b-5 claims, not enough
227

SEC v. Perry, No. CV-11-1309R, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 31,
2012); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). At least one
administrative decision has also taken this position. In re Flannery, Exchange Act
Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *35 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011).
228
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006); 17 CFR § 240.14a-9(a) (2011). See also, Mercury
Interactive, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3.
229
Mercury Interactive, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3.
230
Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6.
231
15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2006).
232
Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6.
233
Id.
234
Id.
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courts have considered the issue yet for this holding to be considered
a trend. And if these cases do not hold up on appeal, and Janus is
applied to an even broader universe of federal securities claims,
private litigants and the SEC’s ability to pursue violators of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws will be further hamstrung.
IV. POLICY REASONS FOR MORE EXPANSIVE 10B-5 LIABILITY
As discussed above, Janus could have potentially far-reaching
effects that limit the ability of private litigants and the SEC to pursue
claims against violators of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws. Specifically, as courts attempt to apply Janus outside
of the mutual fund context, there will certainly be further restrictions
on the ability to bring claims against other secondary actors, such as
accountants, lawyers, investment banks, and underwriters. But in
addition to restrictions on secondary actors, plaintiffs will also have
more difficulty bringing claims against corporate insiders and even,
in some jurisdictions, against the issuers themselves if theories of
collective scienter are rejected.
Due to the complexities of the public disclosure process,
particularly in large publicly traded companies, the notion that one
person or entity has “ultimate authority” over any given publicly
235
transmitted representation is unrealistic. After Janus, this reality of
diffused responsibility in the creation of public filings and other
publicly disclosed corporate statements will make it difficult to find
an appropriate defendant in securities fraud actions for corporate
236
misrepresentations.
And since the Janus holding has been
extended to enforcement actions, the SEC is similarly limited by the
holding. Moreover, it is possible that the SEC’s ability to bring claims
under other securities laws—not just Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—
may be affected as well.
The ability of private litigants and the SEC to pursue violators of
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws has historically
been viewed as necessary to support the three main purposes of the
235

Himes, supra note 151 (“The signing of an SEC or a SOX certification by a
senior officer is meaningful conduct—but does signing alone mean that one has
‘ultimate authority’ over all of the contents of a document, when many others
perform significant roles for the corporate-reporting function? . . . The complex
realities of corporate public disclosures may present uncertainty whether a given
insider actually has final authority over supposed misstatements.”).
236
King, supra note 105, at 426 (“In a large organization, the ‘ultimate authority’
over language may be diffused and seemingly shared between many parties. In such
a situation, the court will find it difficult to determine which party actually has
‘ultimate authority’ without extensive discovery and a trial.”).
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federal securities laws: “(1) deterrence of fraud, (2) compensation of
237
The
victims, and (3) increase of confidence in investor markets.”
need for stringent securities regulation is as compelling now as it ever
has been. The unraveling of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, the
discovery of the widespread fraud involved in the mortgage scandals,
the still-lingering questions about potential wrongdoing that
occurred in connection with the resulting financial crash, and, most
recently, the uncovering of the Libor rate-rigging scandal are just a
few indicators from the past five years that corporate securities fraud
is, more than ever, a powerful force.
The success of the U.S. markets relies heavily on investor
238
confidence in the integrity of the markets. The ability of the SEC
and private litigants to hold wrongdoers accountable for violations of
the federal securities laws supports the integrity of the markets by
giving investors faith that appropriate measures are in place to deter
fraud and, when necessary, punish wrongdoers and compensate
239
It is no coincidence that the U.S. markets are both the
victims.
240
safest and the strongest in the world.
To maintain this investor
confidence, the private right of action against wrongdoers must
remain strong.
The Supreme Court in Stoneridge, Central Bank, and Janus
expressed its concern over expanding the private cause of action for
241
10b-5 violations.
While the Court still recognizes the implied
242
private right of action, it has attempted to reverse the decades of
243
expansion of that right.
One reason asserted for limiting the private right of action is to
curb the frequency of attorney-driven strike suits that subject
innocent corporations, insiders, and secondary actors to expensive
discovery and litigation, with the goal of extracting large nuisance

237

Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1027.
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 174 n.10
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239
Id.
240
Id. at 175.
241
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
242
The private right of action is referred to as an “implied” right because neither
the language of Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 expressly provides for that right. But
district courts first began recognizing the right in 1946, and the Supreme Court
validated the private right of action in 1971. Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1027 n.31.
243
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302
(2011); see also King, supra note 105, at 411–12; Andy Seitz, Case Note, Securities
Law—The Implied Private Right of Action Under Rule 10B-5 Does not Extend Liability to
Aiders and Abettors, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 425, 439 (2011).
238
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244

settlements.
While certainly the prevalence of abusive litigation is
an important concern, the goals of deterring meritless suits on the
one hand and protecting innocent investors from fraud on the other
are not mutually exclusive. For instance, Congress attempted to
satisfy both goals simultaneously with the implementation of the
PSLRA in 1995. In enacting the PSLRA, Congress recognized the
need to balance the important interest of encouraging meritorious
private suits to enforce federal antifraud securities laws with the
245
interest of corporations in avoiding abusive litigation.
The heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA strike that
balance, “requir[ing] plaintiffs to state with particularity both the
facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing
246
scienter.”
The PSLRA appropriately limits the private right of
action by imposing certain exacting substantive and procedural
requirements on would-be plaintiffs, thereby protecting corporations
from strike suits. This should sufficiently address the concern
expressed by the Supreme Court in Stoneridge and Janus about the
expansion of the private right of action without overly narrowing the
247
scope of who can be considered a “maker” of a statement, to the
point of rendering the 10b-5 private right of action toothless. Yet in
the face of the Supreme Court decisions since Central Bank that
further narrowed the private right of action under 10b-5, the PSLRA
has yet to achieve the balance it seeks; rather, “fraud has become
248
increasingly prevalent.”
The Supreme Court’s decisions curtailing the 10b-5 private
cause of action are not without their supporters. Those who support
this line of cases point to the benefits of predictable rules as one
244

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 163–64. For instance, it is not uncommon for plaintiffs’
attorneys to file suit based solely on a significant change in the issuer’s stock price or
a restatement of financials, without regard to any actual wrongdoing of the issuer in
the hope that, through discovery, they might uncover a plausible cause of action.
Brief for Attorney’s Liab. Assurance Soc’y, Inc., As Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent , at 10 n.2, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S.
148 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363261.
245
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
246
Id.
247
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
248
Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1083. And the perpetrators of these frauds are often
repeat players. Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, and Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08
/business/in-sec-fraud-cases-banks-make-and-break-promises.html?pagewanted=all
(“Nearly all of the biggest financial companies [on Wall Street, including Citigroup],
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America among
them, have settled fraud cases by promising the S.E.C. that they would never again
violate an antifraud law, only to do it again in another case a few years later.”).
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249

reason for the narrow interpretation of the right. But the “ultimate
authority” test set forth in Janus is far from providing a bright-line
rule and, as illustrated in Part III supra, certainly does not lend itself
to predictable results. Moreover, the realities of the creation and
publication of corporate statements, particularly within large,
publicly traded corporations, make it difficult to apply the Janus rule.
A rule requiring the identification of one person (or entity), and one
alone, who has “ultimate authority” over statements issued to the
public, when really the process of disclosure is a complex one
involving diffuse responsibility of a team of individuals, will lead to
inconsistent results, as evidenced by lower courts’ interpretation and
application of
Janus.
Moreover, attributing “maker” status
automatically to the signatory of the document containing the
misstatement seems an imprecise means of designating fault.
Supporters of Janus would also argue that the SEC enforcement
arm is sufficient protection for investors and deterrence for
250
wrongdoers. Yet the SEC is just as limited as private litigants by the
Janus decision. As noted above, though Janus only involved a private
action, courts have almost uniformly found that Janus applies equally
251
to SEC enforcement actions.
It is true that the SEC has certain
causes of action available to it that are not available to private
litigants, which some supporters of Janus have used to suggest that
252
the SEC enforcement arm still adequately protects investors.
For
instance, the SEC can bring claims of aiding and abetting against
potential violators of 10b-5, claims which are not available to private
253
litigants after Central Bank.
But in order to bring a claim of
secondary liability—such as an aiding and abetting claim under
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act or a control person liability claim
254
under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act —the SEC must first
249

Brief for Attorney’s Liab. Assurance Soc’y, Inc., As Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, supra note 244, at 5.
250
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008)
(“The enforcement power is not toothless. Since September 30, 2002, SEC
enforcement actions have collected over $10 billion in disgorgement and penalties,
much of it for distribution to injured investors.”).
251
See supra note 105 and accompanying text. This is very similar to what
happened in the aftermath of Central Bank. Though that case only involved a private
10b-5 action, courts subsequently imposed the holding—that claims of aiding and
abetting were no longer available under 10b-5—on the SEC as well. This became
accepted such that it took Congressional action for aiding and abetting claims to be
available to the SEC. See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
252
King, supra note 105, at 430.
253
See supra text accompanying note 44.
254
Section 20(a) creates a cause of action against individuals who exercise
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255

establish an underlying primary violation. Since Janus will apply to
any primary violation the SEC seeks to litigate, the SEC’s ability to
establish the requisite underlying primary violation will be limited.
Without the ability to establish the underlying violation, the SEC will
be unable to utilize its claims of secondary liability against those
wrongdoers who participated in the fraud. And the fact that the
Janus holding may ultimately be extended to litigation under other
securities laws like Section 17(a) of the Securities Act further
256
frustrates this problem.
Furthermore, the private right of action takes on increased
importance as a means of achieving the goals of the federal securities
laws when one considers the current political and regulatory
environment.
The SEC is frequently criticized for failing to
adequately police markets and for routinely settling claims with
wrongdoers, who are not required to admit the charges against them,
257
rather than pursuing litigation. For instance, the fact that the SEC
failed to identify the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, despite having
made numerous inquiries into his business, generated a large
258
backlash against the regulatory agency.

control over a controller person, such as a corporation, that has committed a
violation of 10(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006). It imposes secondary liability on the
controlling person for the fraud committed by the one who is controlled. In re
Merck & Co., Sec, Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. 2:05-cv-02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL
3444199, at *36 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011).
255
See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 168 (1994) (setting forth the first element of a claim of aiding and
abetting as requiring a showing of “a primary violation of Section 10(b)”);
Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 635–36 (11th Cir. 2010)
(holding that, since 20(a) imposes derivative liability on control persons for
violations committed by others, a plaintiff must plead an underlying primary
violation to state a viable 20(a) claim). See also, Rains, supra note 36, at 11 (“Courts
generally have agreed that, at a minimum, a plaintiff must prove that the ‘controlled’
person committed a primary violation, and that the ‘control’ person, in some
fashion, had ‘control’ over the ‘controlled’ person.”).
256
See supra notes 215–25 and accompanying text.
257
See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, What Happens When Wall Street Breaks the Law? Not
Much, CNN OPINION (Nov. 30, 2011, 7:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/30
/opinion/etzioni-sec/index.html. It should be noted that settling with defendants
and allowing them to avoid admitting liability is not necessarily as negative a
consequence as this critic would suggest. Settling, rather than litigating, conserves
already scarce resources. Additionally, allowing defendants to not admit liability
potentially allows recovery from the deeper pocket of the D&O insurer rather than
the individual him or herself who may in effect be judgment-proof. See infra notes
271–274 and accompanying text for further discussion of this issue.
258
See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Court Documents Show How SEC Failed to Nab Madoff
MONEY
WATCH
(Mar.
12,
2009,
4:09
PM),
in
2006,
CBS
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_162-4862380-503983.html.
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Few critics seem to recognize, however, the limited resources
259
that the SEC has to pursue such investigations.
In 2011, for
instance, the Congressional appropriations committee cut the SEC’s
260
budget request for 2012 by $222.5 million, despite the fact that the
SEC’s responsibilities were expanded by the enactment of the Dodd261
In so
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
cutting the budget request, the committee specifically referenced the
SEC’s track record dealing with Ponzi schemes and pointed to
262
concern over the federal deficit.
Each of these rationales for
cutting the SEC’s budget is puzzling. It is likely, at least in part,
because of the SEC’s lack of resources that it was unable to detect the
263
Madoff scheme in the first place.
Additionally, the SEC’s use of
funds does not contribute to the deficit in that the SEC is financed by
the fees it imposes on those it regulates and, in fact, the SEC actually
264
generates revenue in the form of fines and disgorgements.
It is
likely that the SEC’s ability to police the market is subject to shifting
political winds.
Even before the SEC was charged with the expanded
259

Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1027–28 (“Even though the SEC has broad authority
to bring enforcement actions, its limited resources prevent it from detecting and/or
prosecuting even the most flagrant abuses of the securities laws.”).
260
James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street is Tossed A Bone, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul, 15, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/budget
-cuts-to-sec-reduce-its-effectiveness.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
261
According to the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, &
Urban Affairs, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted to “create a sound economic
foundation to grow jobs, protect consumers, rein in Wall Street and big bonuses, end
bailouts and too big to fail, [and] prevent another financial crisis.” S. COMM. ON
BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, available at http://banking.senate.gov
/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary
_Final.pdf. It expands in the SEC’s regulatory reach in a number of ways. For
instance, Dodd-Frank gives the SEC authority to regulate over-the-counter
derivatives, requires hedge funds and private equity advisors to register with the SEC,
creates an Office of Credit Ratings at the SEC, and institutes a new SEC
whistleblower program, just to name a few of the changes. Id.
262
Stewart, supra note 260.
263
In fact, at least one investigation was stalled when the team investigating
Madoff was shifted to a different, seemingly higher priority investigation, since the
SEC did not have enough staff to conduct both simultaneously. Id. In this light, the
idea of cutting funding because of failure to adequately catch wrongdoers seems
preposterous. If the police were unable to prevent a rash of murders in a high-crime
area of a city due to lack of police presence in that area, surely the most immediate
response would not be that, since the police were incompetent, their budget should
be cut, thereby leaving even fewer officers to monitor and respond to calls in the
high-crime area.
264
Id.
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responsibilities of Dodd-Frank, the SEC struggled with
265
Manpower is costly (and additional manpower is
underfunding.
potentially unavailable due to a recent hiring freeze), litigation is
expensive, and resources—such as sophisticated IT functions to ease
the burden of document review and production in cases that are
266
frequently document-intensive—are limited or nonexistent.
As
such, the SEC may find itself in the position of having to restrict its
operations by settling cases it might otherwise litigate, closing
investigations sooner than desired, and restricting investigations of
267
overseas companies due to the expense of travel. Making sure the
private right of action remains strong can help supplement the SEC
enforcement arm, particularly in this political climate where the SEC,
serving as Congress’s scapegoat for corporate greed, is struggling with
underfunding.
Additionally, allowing private litigants and the SEC to pursue
claims against individual wrongdoers and secondary actors provides
compensation to victims of fraud where otherwise no remedy would
be available. For instance, in Janus, JIF—the business trust set up to
hold the mutual funds—was the only entity that could be held
268
liable.
But since it had no assets of its own with which to
269
compensate plaintiffs, plaintiffs were left without a remedy. Even in
instances where the issuer does have assets from which to satisfy
claims, allowing recovery against corporate insiders and secondary
actors removes the problem of the circular recovery whereby
plaintiffs are limited to recovering only from the corporate entity
itself, thereby reducing the share value of all shareholders’ stock, and
effectively transferring wealth from the shareholders who are outside
270
of the class of plaintiffs to those within.
By allowing litigants to
265

The SEC regulates more than 35,000 institutions. Under the new legislation,
hedge fund advisors would be added as well. Id.
266
Punctuating the resources issue is the stark disparity between the resources of
the SEC and those it regulates. “[I]n 2009 Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase . . . spent
$4.6 billion each—four times the S.E.C.’s entire annual budget—on information
technology alone.” Id.
267
Id.
268
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
269
Editorial, So No One’s Responsible, supra note 86.
270
Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1075 (“Because damages in securities actions against
issuers are ultimately borne by the issuer’s own shareholders, such lawsuits have been
criticized as a series of pocket-shifting wealth transfers from shareholders who
purchased outside the class period to shareholders who purchased during the class
period. This criticism does not apply to actions brought against secondary actors.”)
Just as this criticism does not apply to actions brought against secondary actors, it
would not apply to actions brought against corporate insiders, assuming
indemnification by their corporate employers was not permitted.
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proceed against the corporate insiders, and not just the corporate
issuer, victims of fraud have an additional avenue of relief. While
allowing plaintiffs to pursue claims against corporate insiders might
not provide the same deep pockets as does pursuing claims against
271
secondary actors like investment banks and accounting firms, it
would at least avoid the circularity problem, assuming
indemnification from their corporate employers is not an option, and
272
provide plaintiffs with another avenue for relief. And given the fact
that executive compensation has soared in the past decade, some of
these individuals may have fairly substantial personal assets capable of
satisfying these claims.
Even in those instances where the individual does not have
substantial personal assets, such claims may be able to be satisfied out
of corporate directors and officers (D&O) insurance policies. It is
true that D&O policies typically contain conduct-based exclusions,
which exclude losses arising from certain conduct, such as fraud or
273
intentional violation of the law. But such exclusions frequently are
limited to situations where such fraudulent conduct has been
established by a final adjudication of a court of competent
274
jurisdiction.
The SEC has long had a policy of resolving
271

For instance, in the Enron securities litigation, plaintiffs obtained
approximately seven billion dollars in settlement from investment bank advisors
alone. Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1077.
272
See infra Part V.B.1 for additional discussion of indemnification considerations.
273
See, e.g., Farkas v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 861 F. Supp. 2d
716 , 723 (E.D. Va. 2012) (involving a D&O policy with an exclusion for acts “arising
out of, based upon or attributable to the committing in fact of any criminal,
fraudulent or dishonest act, or any willful violation of any statute, rule or law.”);
Endurance Am. Specialty Co. v. Lance-Kashian & Co., No. CV-F-10-1284-LJO-BAM,
2011 WL 5417103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (discussing a D&O policy with an
exclusion for acts that are intentionally dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal); In re
Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & “Erisa” Litigation, 391 F. Supp. 2d 541, 559
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (involving an exclusion to a D&O policy for acts “brought about or
contributed to by the dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission”);
see also, Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Loss of SEC ‘Neither Admit, Nor Deny’ Settlements Could
Have Significant Impact, PLUS BLOG (May 22, 2012, 8:26 AM),
http://plusblog.org/2012/05/22/loss-of-sec-neither-admit-nor-deny-settlements
-could-have-significant-impact/.
274
See, e.g., Farkas, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 721–22 (interpreting a D&O policy’s
exclusion for the commission of certain acts “in fact” as requiring a final adjudication
or “at least some evidentiary proof that the insured reaped an illegal profit”)
(quoting PMI Mortg. Ins. Co. v. Am Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. C 02–1774 PJH,
2006 WL 825266, at *5–6 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2006)); Endurance Am. Specialty Co., 2011
WL 5417103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (analyzing a D&O policy with an exclusion for
acts that are “intentionally dishonest, fraudulent, or [a] criminal act of any Insured
as determined by a final adjudication . . . .”); In re Enron Corp., 391 F.Supp.2d at 572
(interpreting a D&O policy with an exclusion for acts involving “dishonest,
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enforcement actions without requiring the defendant to admit
275
Instead, the SEC frequently allows defendants to settle
liability.
276
As such, in
claims on a “neither admit, nor deny” basis.
enforcement actions at least, the limits of a D&O policy may still be
available to satisfy judgments. Even when recovery under a D&O
policy is not possible and where the individual defendant does not
have substantial assets to satisfy the claim, the goal of deterrence is
still satisfied by allowing litigants to pursue these individual
wrongdoers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Legislative Adoption of the Creator Standard
In the wake of Janus and its ensuing confusion in the lower
courts about how to apply the “ultimate authority” test and the
potential for the 10b-5 right of action for misrepresentation to be
unreasonably curtailed, it is clear that legislative action is necessary.
The extremely pro-business stance taken by the Supreme Court in
Janus has left some wondering whether some businesses are not only
277
too big to fail, but also “too big to be held accountable.” As such,
just as Congress took up the issue of 10b-5 liability in the wake of the
Central Bank decision, Congress must do so again now.
Through Congressional action, the Janus “ultimate authority”
fraudulent, criminal, or malicious act[s] or omission[s]” if a “final adjudication
establishes that acts of active and deliberate dishonesty were committed . . . with
actual dishonest purpose and intent and were material to the cause of action so
adjudicated”).
275
Thomas O. Gorman, Neither Admit Nor Deny is Not the Issue in SEC Settlements,
LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES: SEC. L. BLOG (May 21, 2012, 10:17 AM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/corpsec/blogs/corporateandsecuritieslaw
blog/archive/2012/05/21/neither-admit-nor-deny-is-not-the-issue-in-sec-settlements
.aspx.
276
The practice of allowing defendants to resolve litigation with the SEC through
settlements on a neither admit nor deny basis was recently called into question by
Judge Rakoff in SEC v. Citigroup when he rejected a settlement, citing the practice.
827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). But the Second Circuit upheld the SEC’s
practice on appeal. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163–65 (2d
Cir. 2012).
277
Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of the Honorable Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3d9031b47812de2592c
3baeba607fb62&wit_id=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba607fb62-0-1.
Senator Leahy
pointed out that this was the most pro-business Court in seventy-five years, noting
that under Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has ruled in a pro-business fashion in
sixty-one percent of its cases.
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test should be abandoned in favor of a version of the SEC’s proposed
278
“creator” standard. Under the creator standard, there would be no
limit on the number of individuals who could be held accountable
for a particular misstatement. In other words, any suggestion in Janus
that there can be only one maker of a misstatement held responsible
would be set aside. Under the “creator” standard, individuals will be
able to “make” a statement if they created it, wrote it, or played a
substantial enough role in the creation or writing of it so as to be
279
considered the author or co-author of the statement. This should
280
be so even if the creator is not expressly publicly identified. Express
attribution of a statement to an individual or entity could certainly be
strong evidence suggesting that someone was a maker of a statement,
but it would not be necessary to find liability and it would not limit
liability solely to the person to whom the statement was expressly
attributed.
Using the creator standard instead of the ultimate authority test
would serve to eliminate the flawed analogy presented in Janus of the
281
relationship between the speechwriter and the speech giver.
The
Court’s notion that it is the speech giver who has ultimate authority
over the statements delivered, not the speechwriter—and therefore it
is the giver, not the writer, who should be held liable—leads to
potentially haphazard results. For instance, if it is only the speech
giver who can be liable in that scenario, it becomes impossible to
impose liability in the frequent circumstance where the equivalent of
the speech giver (e.g., the CFO signing a public filing) does not have
the requisite scienter. Using the creator standard and abandoning
the speechwriter analogy would enable plaintiffs to hold culpable
individual corporate insiders accountable for the wrongdoing and
reflect the corporate reality that it is typically not just one person who
has responsibility for a statement.
Replacing the ultimate authority test with the creator standard
would also alleviate the problem that, to the extent that there is one
278

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra
note 92, at 14.
279
Id.; see also, Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1047.
280
Id.
281
Additionally, lower courts and administrative agencies have already begun to
abandon the analogy in their application of the ultimate authority test. For instance
in the administrative proceeding, In re Flannery, the administrative law judge held
that the person who gave a presentation was not the one with ultimate authority over
the content of the presentation because he was merely delivering the message
created by another that he was asked to deliver as part of his job. In re Flannery,
Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *38 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011). For a
more complete discussion of this case, see supra Part III.A.
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person who might be considered to have ultimate authority based on
a public attribution of the statement to the individual, that person
often does not have the requisite scienter for liability to attach. For
instance, under the creator standard, if a CFO signs a SOX
certification attached to financials containing misstatements, that
public attribution to the CFO might be seen as evidence that he was
the (or one of the) creator(s) of the statement. If the other elements
of 10b-5 liability could be met, including scienter, he could be held
liable. But if the CFO was duped by other less senior officers within
the enterprise into thinking the financials were true, that CFO would
likely not have the requisite scienter to establish liability, unless he
was severely reckless. Under Janus, in this scenario, potentially no
one would be held accountable (particularly if the wrongdoer’s
scienter could not be imputed to the corporation). Under the
creator standard, however, though the CFO might not be liable, the
less senior officers with culpability could be.
Finally, by allowing the imposition of liability on corporate
insiders and secondary actors in appropriate circumstances, beyond
what is allowable under Janus, the creator standard will give victims of
fraud additional avenues of relief over and above the relief from the
issuer itself, thereby avoiding the problem of the circular recovery, or
as in the case of Janus, no recovery at all. This would serve to
promote the underlying goals of the federal securities laws to deter
and punish fraud, to compensate victims, and to increase investor
confidence in the markets.
Ideally, this legislative solution of adopting the creator standard
would apply to the SEC enforcement action and to the private cause
of action alike. At a minimum, however, this standard should be
adopted for SEC enforcement actions.
B. Judicial Considerations Prior to Congressional Action
While waiting for congressional action to replace the “ultimate
authority” test of Janus and resolve the question of who the “maker”
of a statement is for 10b-5 purposes, district courts and circuit courts
will be faced with considering two issues in particular: (1) how the
issue of collective scienter should be resolved in light of Janus, and
(2) whether the Janus ultimate authority test should be applied to
other federal securities laws.
1. Collective Scienter Issue
Courts looking at the issue of collective scienter should adopt a
hybrid rule that does not go as far as the broadest forms of collective
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scienter—allowing imputation of scienter from the aggregate
knowledge of all employees—or even so far as the watered down
version of collective scienter—allowing imputation so long as at least
282
one management-level employee had scienter.
But the proposed
rule should also not reject collective scienter outright. Specifically,
rather than allowing imputation of the scienter only from the
“maker” of the statement (which post-Janus would presumably be the
one person or entity with “ultimate authority” over the statement),
courts should allow imputation of scienter from anyone who
contributed to the making of the statement. In other words, courts
should impose something of a “creator” standard to the issue of
283
collective scienter. This is not without precedent prior to Janus. At
least one district court has considered this issue since Janus and held
that the court can look not only to the state of mind of “the
individual corporate official . . . who made the statement, but also
[to] those who order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who
284
furnish information or language for inclusion therein or the like.”
Critics of the collective scienter theory have pointed out that it
places the onus of identifying employees with knowledge of the falsity
of the statement on the corporation, an approach that “may be akin
285
to finding a needle in a haystack.” Because the knowledge in those
instances is so deeply embedded within the corporation, the
corporation is in no better position than the SEC to detect the person
with actual scienter and therefore, imposing liability on the
286
corporation does not promote deterrence.
Additionally, the costs
of focusing perhaps “more [corporate] resources than appropriate
on the area of corporate disclosures . . . outweigh [any] marginal
287
benefits” that might result in the public disclosures.
Critics have
also argued that the use of collective scienter makes it difficult to
predict what types of cases would be pursued and therefore difficult
288
to counsel corporate clients on compliance.
But these concerns would be tempered by the fact that the form
of collective scienter proposed here is more similar to the rule
proposed in that line of cases rejecting collective scienter than it is to
282

See supra Part III.B.2 for a more thorough discussion of collective scienter.
Southland Securities Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366
(5th Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 201–204 and accompanying text.
284
Kerr v. Exobox Techs., CV No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *14 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 23, 2012) (citation omitted).
285
Bondi, supra note 164, at 26.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 27.
288
Id. at 28.
283
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those jurisdictions that permit theories of collective scienter. The
limited form of collective scienter proposed here would merely serve
to counter-act the potential effect of Janus of eliminating not only
claims against secondary actors and corporate insiders, but also
claims against the issuer itself. With the new limitations imposed on
asserting 10b-5 claims, Senator Patrick Leahy has commented that
plaintiffs’ ability “to band together to hold corporations accountable”
that have engaged in fraud “has been seriously undermined by the
289
Supreme Court.” In the aftermath of Janus, the benefits of a weak
form of collective scienter would outweigh the potential costs.
Additionally, this proposal only applies to situations where
scienter is imputed from the wrongdoer to the corporate issuer
itself—it does not go so far as to say that the scienter of the
wrongdoer should be able to be attributed to a different officer or
employee. If courts are willing to impute the scienter of the
wrongdoer to the employee or officer to whom attribution is given,
there is a real possibility there would be a significant chilling effect of
such a rule that imposes liability on the CFO or other corporate
officer merely for signing a public filing. Though state corporate
codes typically allow for indemnification of directors and sometimes
officers when they are sued in their corporate capacity, such
indemnification provisions are typically limited. For instance, under
the Model Business Corporation Act, indemnification by the
corporation is only permissible if the individual acted in good faith
and believed his actions were in the best interests of the
290
corporation.
Corporations are also free to put additional
291
limitations on indemnification in their charter documents, and
some elect to limit indemnification to directors or officers who did
292
not act in a way that was reckless or involved willful misconduct.
For a director or officer to be found liable for (or guilty of) 10b-5
securities violations, the showing of scienter would likely be enough
293
to establish that indemnification would not be appropriate.
289

Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
(2011) (statement of the Honorable Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3d9031b47812de2592c
3baeba607fb62&wit_id=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba607fb62-0-1.
290
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.51 (2008); see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
8, §145 (2011). And, in a criminal proceeding, indemnification is only permissible if
the defendant had no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145.
291
See, e.g., WISC. STAT. § 180.0852 (2012).
292
Rains et al., supra note 101, at 5.
293
In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 740 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
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Moreover, many courts have expressly held that indemnification is
not available for federal securities law claims, especially for claims
294
The
involving intentional—rather than negligent—misconduct.
threat of liability without indemnification—even where the accused
was an unknowing participant—could have a negative impact on the
ability of corporations to find qualified individuals willing to serve in
295
these roles.
This proposal attempts to avoid that outcome by
allowing courts to impute scienter of the wrongdoer, but only for
purposes of assessing the corporation’s liability—not that of other
corporate insiders.
Arguably, if Congress were to adopt the creator standard of
liability, thereby rejecting the Janus standard, the issue of collective
scienter would take care of itself. Even in jurisdictions that reject
notions of collective scienter, scienter can be imputed from the
“maker” of the statement. If the “maker” is defined using the creator
standard, the proposed rule for collective scienter articulated above
would, by default, be adopted. Therefore, the proposed judicial
action is only necessary as a stop-gap until a legislative solution is
(holding that because indemnification is not available to parties who have knowingly
and willfully violated the securities laws, and because scienter is required to be liable
for 10(b) violations, indemnification was not available); see also EDWARD BRODSKY &
M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORP. OFFS. & DIRS., DUTIES & LIABS. § 19:9 (2011).
294
Dept. of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 931 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 549 (D. Colo. 1989);
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969). In fact,
courts have consistently held that indemnification with respect to willful violations of
the securities laws, such as 10(b) of the Exchange Act, is against public policy.
BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 293, at §19:9. Even in cases involving securities laws
that require only a negligence standard of liability, some courts have found that
indemnification is inappropriate. Id. The exception to the basic rule that directors
and officers cannot recover for securities laws claims is that they will be able to
recover when they did not admit liability or they otherwise prove they were not at
fault. Greenwald v. Am. Medcare Corp., 666 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Raychem Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1177–79 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
The PSLRA, for instance, allows for indemnification where the defendant prevails.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). It should be noted that at least one state’s
corporate code expressly provides that directors and officers can be indemnified for
violations of securities laws.
WISC. STAT. § 180.0859 (2012).
But such
indemnification is still subject to the other provisions of the code, and elsewhere in
the code, indemnification is disallowed for behavior involving willful misconduct or a
transaction from which the director or officer received an improper personal
benefit. WISC. STAT. § 180.0851(2)(a) (2012). As such, indemnification would likely
still not be possible in the face of a 10b-5 violation where scienter has been
established.
295
One way that this chilling effect is mitigated is through a corporation’s offer to
indemnify defendants for settlements in which they have not admitted liability.
BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 293, at § 19:9; see supra note 275 and accompanying
text for further discussion.
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enacted.
It is not just the courts that will have the opportunity to act in
the interim before a legislative solution is adopted; corporations may
be able to take ameliorating actions as well. Specifically, if courts
continue to find that express attribution is enough to satisfy the Janus
test, it may be wise for corporations and corporate insiders to begin
296
to use strategic allocation of liability through attribution.
For
instance, a board of directors might adopt a resolution delegating
“ultimate authority” over particular public statements to a specific
297
officer or employee.
It is not clear whether such a non-public
attribution would be effective after Janus to immunize all others from
liability who are not mentioned in the corporate resolution. This
298
would likely be analyzed as a case of “implicit” attribution. But even
a decision by a corporation to allocate attribution publicly—by having
a particular officer sign a filing for instance—may be ineffective.
While it may be a seemingly good prophylactic measure by
corporations to distribute potential liability to whom it considers to
be the appropriate parties, it is unclear what effect this will have on
liability distribution. For instance, if this is in fact a successful means
of limiting the universe of potential “makers” of a statement to one
individual, the question will become whether or not such a “maker”—
for instance, one who has signed a public filing—will have the
requisite scienter to find 10b-5 liability, as discussed in Part III.A
supra. Even though the effectiveness of such express attribution to
cut off liability to some and assign it to others is still in question,
however, attribution will certainly at least be a factor in courts’
decisions and may help corporations allocate liability to the person or
persons within the entity who should most appropriately bear
299
responsibility.
2. Application to Other Federal Securities Laws
In addressing the issue of whether Janus should be extended
beyond 10b-5 to other federal securities laws such as Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act, Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, and Section
34(b) of the Investment Company Act, district courts should
296

Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7.
Id. at 4.
298
Obviously, questions of implicit attribution are even more complicated than
those of express attribution. While Janus seems to specifically account for this
scenario of implicit attribution, the Court did not illustrate what kinds of actions on
the part of a defendant would allow for “implicit attribution” of misstatements to an
individual, such that he or she would be considered the maker of that statement.
299
Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7.
297
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continue to follow the lead of the majority of the handful of district
courts that have already decided this issue and similarly hold that
Janus should not be so extended. Federal securities laws that do not
contain the operative word “make” should easily be excluded from
application of the Janus rule. And those that provide for the
operative word, such as Section 34(b) of the Investment Company
Act, frequently do not include private rights of action. Therefore, the
policy behind the Janus decision—to curb the expansion of the
private right of action—would not be served by application of the
rule in these cases. Extending Janus to these other areas of securities
laws would unnecessarily and unreasonably further limit the ability of
private litigants and the SEC to fulfill the goals of the federal
securities laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
A year has passed since the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Janus. In Janus, the Court attempted to curb the
expansion of the 10b-5 private right of action by providing a bright
line rule between what constitutes a primary violation of 10b-5—and
thus actionable by private litigants—and what merely constitutes a
secondary violation for which private litigants should have no
recourse. In the year since the opinion, however, activity in the lower
courts has shown that this rule does not provide the clear line that it
purports to.
In the wake of Janus, lower courts have been faced with a
number of questions for which the Supreme Court provided no
obvious answers. For instance, generally the lower courts are in
agreement that Janus applies to corporate insiders, not just secondary
actors as in Janus. But they are not necessarily in agreement as to
300
how Janus should apply.
Some lower courts have dismissed claims
involving insiders on the grounds that these individuals did not have
301
Other courts have allowed
ultimate authority over the statement.
claims against insiders to proceed where the misstatements were
302
expressly publicly attributed to the insiders.
Even if these claims
are allowed to proceed to trial, however, success of the plaintiffs on
the merits seems unlikely in light of the other requirements of 10b-5
liability—specifically, the requirement that the defendant have the
requisite state of mind. In such cases, the individual director or

300
301
302

See supra notes 111–33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.

JEFFRIES (DO NOT DELETE)

548

4/9/2013 8:14 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:491

officer to whom a statement is publicly attributed—such as the CFO
signing a SOX certification or a chief marketing officer making a
press announcement—may have no reason to know that the data he
or she is signing off on contains fraudulent information. While there
may be policy reasons for holding this individual liable for the
misstatement anyway, such liability will not attach pursuant to Rule
10b-5 because of a lack of scienter. And the person who actually
prepared the fraudulent information upon which the public
announcement was made also will not be liable under 10b-5 because,
after Janus, such an individual did not “make” the misrepresentation.
It would seem that Justice Breyer’s prediction—that “guilty
management” might fool both the board and management, yet, after
303
Janus, no one would be liable —will have come true.
Yet even more troubling than the impact of Janus on the
potential liability of culpable insiders is the fact that, in many
jurisdictions, Janus has the potential to thwart claims against even the
issuers to which the misstatements are attributed. In jurisdictions
rejecting theories of collective scienter, courts will only impute the
scienter of an individual to the entity in instances where the
individual also was the “maker” of the statement. Since Janus limits
the universe of who can be a potential “maker,” there is a distinct
possibility that the insider who is considered the “maker” of the
misstatement will not be the same as the insider who has scienter. If
the maker and the individual with scienter are not the same person, a
court may find that the scienter of the individual cannot be imputed
to the corporation, and therefore the issuer will not be found liable.
In such a circumstance, a plaintiff may be entirely without recourse
for a 10b-5 violation. Even in jurisdictions that have historically
allowed a theory of collective scienter, the question of whether such
theory survives Janus remains unanswered.
Moreover, since the Janus holding most likely applies to the SEC
just as it does to corporate insiders, the SEC’s enforcement arm is just
as limited by the holding as are private litigants. And even though
the SEC has the ability to pursue other secondary claims—such as for
aiding and abetting and for control person liability—each of these
requires a showing of an underlying primary violation. Since any
underlying violation would be subject to Janus, the SEC’s ability to
pursue these secondary violations is limited. Finally, since some
lower courts are extending the Janus ruling to actions brought under
other federal securities laws, the SEC’s reach may be even further
303

Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2310
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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limited.
As these cases continue to work their way through the lower
courts and into the courts of appeals, we will hopefully see resolution
of some of the uncertainty surrounding the Janus decision. But as the
courts apply Janus to corporate insiders, and fail to resolve the
collective scienter issue, issuers and insiders alike will be able to
perpetrate frauds unchecked. Corporations and corporate insiders
should not be able essentially to launder public misstatements by
making sure the corporate mouthpiece to whom they are attributed is
not the same as the person with the fraudulent intent.
A legislative solution appears necessary to remedy the injustice
that Janus promotes. Through Congressional action, the ultimate
authority test should be abandoned in favor of the SEC’s proposed
creator standard, and this standard should apply to both SEC
enforcement actions and the private right of action. This would allow
imposition of liability on those who created a statement, wrote it, or
played a substantial enough role in its making so as to be considered
an author or co-author. Further, this would alleviate the problem of
not being able to establish one person or entity that has both the
requisite scienter and is considered the maker of the statement.
In the absence of legislative action, courts should resolve the
collective scienter issue by adopting a hybrid rule that allows
imputation of scienter not only from the maker of the statement but
also from anyone who contributed to the making of the statement in
such a way to be considered its author or co-author. This would
ensure that the issuer will not be able to avoid liability simply because
the person with the scienter was not also the person with “ultimate
authority” over the statement. Instead, scienter of any individual who
played a large enough role in the authoring of the misstatement
could be imputed to the corporation. Finally, courts should refuse to
extend the Janus rule to claims involving other federal securities laws,
such as Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act. Corporate securities fraud is as big of an issue as it
ever has been and reform is necessary in order to ensure the sanctity
and vitality of the U.S. capital markets.

